

Implementing an Intelligence and Information Sharing Program for the Shawnee Fire

Department

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Certification Statement

I hereby certify that this paper constitutes my own product, that where the language of others is set forth, quotation marks are indicated, and appropriate credit is given where I have used language, ideas, expressions, or writing of another.

Signed: 

Date: September 10, 2018

Abstract

As threats to the Homeland have continued to evolve, information sharing between agencies has become ever more important. The Shawnee Fire Department (SFD) did not have a formal mechanism to share sensitive information with the fire crews who were out on the streets and likely, the first to encounter these threats. The purpose was to determine the need and viability of creating a formal means of sharing intelligence and information with the members of the SFD. Using the action methodology of research, a literature review was conducted with the purpose of answering five questions: (a) What intelligence and information sharing mechanisms currently exist for fire department personnel? (b) What types of information could and should be shared with fire department personnel? (c) What are the benefits of an intelligence and information sharing program for the fire service? (d) What are the downsides of an intelligence and information sharing program for the fire service? (e) Should the Shawnee Fire Department implement an intelligence and information sharing program? Numerous sources were evaluated through literature review, surveys, and personal interviews. Recommendations were developed to enhance the planning and response capabilities for the SFD based on reception and dissemination of sensitive information related to hostile events. Two policies were developed in conjunction with this Applied Research Project. One policy describes the procedures for handling sensitive information and the second policy outlines the procedures for reporting suspicious activity. Intelligence is a two-way street and the fire service has to give in order to receive. Knowing what first responders are walking into before they arrive can have a drastic effect on tactics and strategies used to mitigate a hostile event.

Table of Contents

Certification.....	2
Abstract.....	3
Table of Contents.....	4
Introduction.....	5
Background and Significance.....	7
Literature Review.....	11
Procedures.....	15
Results.....	19
Discussion.....	25
Recommendations.....	30
Reference List.....	32
Appendices	
Appendix A: Sensitive Information Handling Policy.....	37
Appendix B: Suspicious Activity Reporting Policy.....	41
Appendix C: Shawnee Fire Dept Survey.....	45
Appendix D: Executive Fire Officer Survey.....	51
Appendix E: Law Enforcement Survey.....	59

Introduction

As demonstrated by the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, Boston Marathon bombings in 2013, the coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, the terrorist attacks in Brussels in 2016, it is likely communities across the United States and the world will continue to experience violent extremism or other hostile events. These cities and more, have all experienced tragic events carried out by individuals' and groups intent on harming innocent people. Some of the perpetrators have been foreign, others domestic. Events have occurred in large cities and small towns. In all of these events, there was a person or group intent on doing harm to ordinary citizens. For each event, the perpetrator had a reason for carrying out the attack. The question then, is there something that could have been done to prevent such an attack.

After 9-11, a report was commissioned to examine the breaks in the chain that could have prevented the deaths of thousands. It was found that the information sharing between agencies including Federal, State and local was severely restricted (*9-11 Commission Report*, 2004). "As terrorists move to employ new methods of attack, law enforcement and first responders must use comprehensive and timely intelligence to anticipate potential threats and to ensure a high measure of adaptability in their responses" (Pfiefer, 2012).

Law enforcement has long been aware of the value of information sharing between agencies. "In responding to September 11 and subsequent incidents (e.g., the anthrax issue), it became apparent how important it is to incorporate nontraditional collectors of data (e.g., fire and health entities) into prevention efforts" (DOJ, 2006, p. 11). Fire departments across the nation are increasingly called to respond to what many would consider a non-traditional event.

Active shooter, improvised explosive devices, fire as a weapon, and vehicle ramming attacks are out of the norm for most first responders, but they are still required to respond when such an attack occurs. Often, fire departments are not aware of the circumstances surrounding an event due to the lack of information and intelligence sharing between agencies. Fire departments respond when called, usually without the time for a briefing to decide on the best strategy for response. The size of the town and the capability of the fire department is irrelevant in determining the likelihood of a hostile event occurring in one's jurisdiction. Therefore, departments of all sizes and capabilities should seek to increase their awareness of events occurring in their jurisdiction.

The problem was the Shawnee Fire Department (SFD) had no formal mechanism in place for the collection and dissemination of sensitive intelligence and information to the fire crews within the department. Select members of the department had access to some sensitive information, but there were no formal means of distribution. It is imperative that information sharing is commonplace between agencies to improve the situational awareness of all who may be involved in hostile event planning and response.

The purpose of this ARP was to research the viability of implementing an intelligence and information sharing program within the Shawnee Fire Department to increase situational awareness of events happening within the city. The adage that information is power rings true. In this case, that power of information could be put to use preparing for and responding to hostile events in and around the City of Shawnee. The ancillary benefit to the program would be to open the lines of communication with the Shawnee Police Department or other law enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).

Using the action research methodology for this ARP, the goal was to develop an intelligence and information sharing program for the Shawnee Fire Department. This research endeavored to answer the following questions:

1. What intelligence and information sharing mechanisms currently exist for fire department personnel?
2. What types of information could and should be shared with fire department personnel?
3. What are the benefits of an intelligence and information sharing program for the fire service?
4. What are the downsides of an intelligence and information sharing program for the fire service?
5. Should the Shawnee Fire Department implement an intelligence and information sharing program?

Background & Significance

"As criminal and terrorist activity threaten the safety of our nation's citizens and visitors, the ability to quickly exchange relevant information and intelligence becomes increasingly critical" (DOJ, 2006, p. 9). The City of Shawnee is predominately a bedroom community located on the outskirts of the Kansas City Metropolitan region. Shawnee is a booming city in Johnson County, Kansas with an estimated population of just over 66,000 residents and growing (COS, 2018). The Shawnee Fire Department (SFD) is an all-hazards department with capabilities including swift-water rescue, structural collapse rescue, confined space rescue, as well as Hazardous Materials Awareness and Basic Life Support first response. SFD is a growing department which recently increased staffing by twelve firefighters to support the opening of a

fourth fire station in January 2019. This addition increased staffing to a total of 71 personnel including administrative staff.

With its location in the heart of America, Kansas City and the surrounding communities including Shawnee, are at the hub of a vast transportation network. There are two major highways, Interstate 435 and Kansas Highway 10, that bisect the city with Interstates' 70 and 35 located a few miles North and a mile East respectively. There are three rail lines running through Shawnee and several large pipelines that transport liquid and gas fuels. The Kansas River runs along the Northwest border of Shawnee. With the multitude of transportation methods, there is a significant risk for a scenario in which an intentional hostile act could disrupt the transportation network and create a multitude of issues.

In addition to threats from transportation, there are examples of threats of hostile actions that have occurred or been attempted within the City of Shawnee or in nearby regions of Kansas. In 2006, there was an attempted theft of radiologic material from an industrial inspection company in Shawnee (JCEM, 2013, p. 3.227). The attempt was unsuccessful but illustrates the importance of maintaining vigilance. In 2014, an avowed white supremacist, murdered three people at two different Jewish facilities in Overland Park, KS, a neighboring suburb of Shawnee (Rice, 2014). In 2016, three men were found guilty of an attempted plot to bomb an apartment complex in Garden City, KS, where Somali Muslim immigrants lived and worshiped (Burgess, 2018). Also, in 2016, a gunman killed three and wounded 14 at Excel Industries in Hesston, KS after being served a restraining order at work (Eligon et. al., 2016). A cyberattack on Wolf Creek Nuclear Powerplant in 2017 highlighted the vulnerability to cyber-terrorism and the effects a successful attack could produce (Londberg, 2018). According to Google Maps, Wolf Creek is 70 miles Southwest of Shawnee as the crow flies. In an article about cyber-attacks on

nuclear power plants, Stoutland noted, "... any type of attack on a nuclear plant is very concerning. An attack that allows hackers to manipulate the systems that control a nuclear reactor, while very difficult, could have very serious consequences, including potentially nuclear reactor core damage and off-site release of radiation" (2018).

One further example that has occurred several times in Shawnee is when the Shawnee Police Department (SPD) has received calls about suspicious packages in the City. SPD dispatch is the primary public safety answering point (PSAP) and is the initial call taker for 911 calls. SPD then calls in an Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) team, usually from the Olathe Fire Department, to evaluate the package. Often, the EOD team arrives and begins their work without any notification to the SFD. This lack of notification severely hampers the fire crew's ability to effectively respond in the event of a detonation of a device. To date, there had been no formal mechanism to alert SFD to the situation and allow the fire crew in that district to prepare themselves for a potential explosion of the package. Typically, the only notification was through one SFD battalion chief through his personal relationship with an Olathe EOD member.

Giving the crew time to understand the location and potential hazards prior to the request to respond could be beneficial. Admittedly, there is legitimate concern over the information being shared beyond the walls of the fire department and getting to the general public. The possibility of creating panic is one of the reasons sensitive information is not shared in the first place. Hence the desire to create a program within the SFD to ensure that anyone receiving such information understands the responsibilities that come with the reception of that information.

In the midst of writing this ARP, the Kansas City region was awarded a Federal grant to evaluate the plans and capabilities of the region to respond to a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack (CCTA). This grant was managed by the MidAmerica Regional Council of Governments

(MARC). MARC is comprised of 119 cities, nine counties, and two states with its primary mission that of promoting regional cooperation through leadership, planning and action (MARC, 2018). MARC is comprised of various committees, but it is specifically the Regional Homeland Security Coordinating Committee (RHSCC) which is responsible for developing the plans and actions created during the execution of the grant. The RHSCC has further subcommittees that include the Heart of America Fire Chiefs, Metro Police Chiefs, Regional Association of Public Information Officers, Metropolitan Emergency Managers, and the Hospitals Committee to name a few. While these groups typically meet separately, the CCTA grant involved many meetings and workshops where members of each group were able to come together to discuss the regional coordination amongst the disciplines that would be required if Kansas City were to experience a CCTA or any other catastrophic event.

The threat environment is continually evolving and fire departments around the country, the world no less, must continue to evolve with it. The Executive Leadership (EL) course examined the role of adaptive leadership and how the concept can be applied to the fire service (NFA, 2015). The fire service has often been slow to adapt to the changing threat environment. Through adaptive leadership, the fire service can overcome the challenges associated with planning for, and working in hostile event environments. Additionally, EL looked at the role of politics and how the interests of different factions can influence decision making for better or worse. Both topics are especially relevant in the discussion of information sharing between agencies. Knowledge is power, and many people in positions of power are reluctant to cede their knowledge for fear of losing their perceived advantage. This is the adaptive challenge in that it will take changing hearts and minds to get people and agencies to relinquish their hold on

information that can be used for the greater good in preparing all responders to the best of their abilities.

This Applied Research Project works towards meeting goal number two and goal number three of the United States Fire Administrations (USFA) five goals for the 2014-2018 Strategic Plan. Goal two is to promote response, local planning, and preparedness for all hazards while goal three is to enhance the fire and emergency services' capability for response and recovery to all hazards (USFA, 2014, pg. 11-12). Goals number two and three are closely related in preparing the fire service for response to all hazards. This ARP will focus more specifically on threats that are hostile in nature and what the fire service can do to better prepare for those threats.

Literature Review

A literature review was conducted to collect and evaluate what information already existed relating to I&I sharing in the fire service. At the time this ARP was written, 17 years after 9-11, there was a significant amount of literature related to information sharing available. The Department of Justice (DOJ) had published several white papers and other guidance documents describing the need for greater information sharing among all of the emergency services partners from local through Federal agencies. One specific subject that came up was the use of Fusion Centers. The DOJ noted,

...fusion centers can provide public safety entities with information and intelligence that impact them, such as bomb threats, health-related information and intelligence, and/or transportation-related information. Public safety entities (fire, EMS, transportation) often impact the lives of citizens, and ensuring that these entities maintain situational

awareness and are actively involved in the fusion center is important to protecting the lives of citizens (2006, p. 17).

The DOJ went on to further specify that, “Intelligence and information should be provided based on the needs of the user” (2006, p. 14). Meaning that not every user needs the same level of information. Law enforcement will typically require greater access to information, especially criminal information, than the fire service or emergency management.

There are 78 fusion centers located throughout the United States, mostly in urban areas. These “fusion centers are uniquely situated to empower front-line law enforcement, public safety, fire service, emergency response, public health, critical infrastructure protection, and private sector security personnel to lawfully gather and share threat-related information” (DHS, 2018, Fusion Center fact sheet). The fire service can help with providing information as well as receiving information. The fire service can contribute to the prevention, protection, response, recovery, and safety of the community. “The fire service perspective adds an important dimension to all-hazard risk assessments, preparedness activities, and mitigation operations” (DOJ, 2010, p. 2). By embedding fire service personnel in fusion centers, they can view all of the information available to intelligence analysts and thereby assist in the identification and preparation of intelligence products for emergency services consumers (DOJ, 2010, p. 3).

There is contradictory belief that fusion centers are not living up to the expectations originally envisioned, that of information and intelligence sharing between local and state law enforcement agencies. There is serious concern that they have become too secretive and have stepped on the civil liberties of many citizens (Peteritas, 2013). In a report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), it was noted that the DHS and DOJ were providing fusion centers

with knowledge and training to help develop and maintain policies protecting privacy and civil liberties (GAO, 2011).

One resource available to first responders to increase their knowledge and awareness of issues related to terrorism is through affiliation with the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT).

The mission of the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT) is to improve information sharing and enhance public safety. In coordination with the FBI and DHS, JCAT collaborates with other members of the Intelligence Community to research, produce, and disseminate counterterrorism intelligence products for federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government (SLTT) agencies (ODNI, 2018).

Much of the information provided by JCAT is related to the larger counterterrorism efforts at the Federal level and may not be relevant to some areas of the country. JCAT provides a booklet entitled *Intelligence Guide for First Responders*. This booklet is essentially a beginner's guide for gaining an understanding of what intelligence is, how to handle sensitive but unclassified information, and how to obtain access to Intelligence Community (IC) information.

The booklet also includes information on some of the products JCAT produces. This includes products such as; the Fire Line, a one-page DHS U//FOUO document intended to help first responders recognize and identify indicators of terrorism; the First Responder Toolbox, a reference aid also meant to help first responders and private sector partners plan and mitigate against threats against public places such as shopping malls and concert venues; and the Counterterrorism Weekly FOUO document which compiles open source information that may be of interest to first responders and public safety personnel. These products can all be found on the

JCAT website, which is a subsidiary of the National Counterterrorism Center (ODNI, 2018, First responder).

Another tool for collaboration is the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). HSIN can be leveraged to provide a platform for communication between agencies through an online network. “Cross-jurisdictional information sharing is typically hampered by incompatible communications equipment. However, by circumventing those information silos, HSIN allows personnel to quickly respond to threats, coordinate resources and immediately provide assistance” (HSIN, 2018). In fact, HSIN is an extremely powerful platform for information sharing. There are discipline-specific communities within HSIN that require approval from an HSIN administrator to access. However, based on need, members have the ability to crossover between communities, enabling them to share and receive additional discipline specific I&I. Some of the specific communities of interest are; Regional Information Sharing System (RISSNET), a law enforcement group, Technical Resource for Incident Prevention (TRIPwire), related to explosive ordinance, Emergency Management (EM), Emergency Services (ES), and the Fire Service Analyst (FSA).

In addition to these overarching, discipline-specific groups, there are also regional communities such as that hosted by the Mid-America Regional Council (MARC). This HSIN community provides a library of regional resources such as the Regional Coordination Guide, Mass Casualty Incident Plan, and the Tactical Interoperability Communications Plan among others. The MARC HSIN also has information specific to WebEOC and the metro badging and accountability system. WebEOC is a crisis management software that can be used in “handling day-to-day operations, managing special events and responding to disasters” (WebEOC, 2018).

WebEOC is used extensively in the KC Metro region, though there are some conflicts with sharing information between agencies working across the Kansas-Missouri State line.

Another community of interest on HSIN is the Emergency Management and Response-Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC). EMR-ISAC “promotes critical infrastructure protection (CIP) by sharing CIP and emerging threat information with Emergency Services Sector (ESS) departments and agencies nationwide” (USFA, 2018).

Based on review of the literature, there appears to be several options for intelligence and information sharing available to fire service personnel and other first responders. Not all of the information is relevant to every jurisdiction, however there are generic products available to help with planning for, and mitigating against potential threats. There are online platforms designed specifically for sharing information between agencies. However, building relationships seems to be the best method for staying updated with credible intelligence and information.

Procedures

Research for this project began in the Learning Resource Center (LRC) at the National Fire Academy (NFA) in Emmitsburg, MD. Searches for other ARP’s was completed online to determine the extent of research completed on this topic by other EFO students. At the time of the search, there were only a handful of papers on the subject. The search was then expanded beyond ARP’s to include web searches for information related to intelligence and information sharing within the fire service and outside of the fire service. There was a great deal more information related to intelligence sharing in other government agencies, specifically law enforcement. That included everything from local law enforcement, up to State and Federal law enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of

Homeland Security (DHS). These resources helped frame the questions asked and the direction of this ARP.

The second step was to interview two individuals that had first-hand knowledge and experience with an intelligence and information sharing program. The first interview was with Division Chief Kevin Weyand of the Olathe Fire Department. Chief Weyand is in charge of Special Operations which includes the Division of Emergency Management, the Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) team, and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) search and rescue team. This in-person interview was completed on June 22nd at the Olathe Fire Department Administration building. The following four questions were asked in this interview.

1. What intelligence and information sharing mechanisms currently exist for fire department personnel?
2. What types of information could and should be shared with fire department personnel?
3. What are the benefits of an intelligence and information sharing program for the fire service?
4. What are the downsides of an intelligence and information sharing program for the fire service?

This interview provided perspective from a fire service information and intelligence gathering standpoint.

The second interview was with Sergeant Mike Satter. Sgt. Satter works for the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department, but is assigned to the Kansas City Regional Fusion Center (KCRFC). This interview took place on June 14th at the KCRFC following a monthly intelligence briefing. Sgt. Satter noted the KCRFC was expanding the invitation list to these monthly briefings as a means to broaden the dissemination of information beyond law

enforcement. The author was fortunate to be included in the expanded invite list. In this interview, an additional four questions were asked which included the following:

1. What intelligence and information sharing programs are available for the fire service?
2. What are the requirements to be included in an intelligence and information sharing program?
3. How do the mandates from the 9/11 Commission, Department of Homeland Security, and other Federal Agencies to increase the level of information sharing between State and local agencies affect the Kansas City Regional Fusion Center?
4. Do you have any additional thoughts on how further I&I between fire departments and law enforcement can increase the situational awareness of all parties involved?

This interview helped gain perspective from the law enforcement viewpoint.

After both interviews were complete, three different surveys were sent out using SurveyMonkey.com. The first survey was sent to the members of the Shawnee Fire Department to evaluate their knowledge of intelligence and information sharing programs, the benefits and negatives and whether they thought such information would be a valuable addition to SFD's repertoire of programs. Surveys were open from June 24th through July 22nd. A second identical survey was sent to other fire service personnel through several avenues. Those included the Heart of America Fire Chiefs Association as well as the Executive Fire Officer Program (EFOP) consortium from the April 2018 Executive Leadership class. This survey is further referenced as the EFOP survey. This resulted in 26 surveys returned from a broad spectrum of departments across the country. The fire service survey included the following nine questions with the only difference being the SFD survey did not include population:

1. What is the population of the jurisdiction your department serves?

2. Have you ever heard of intelligence and information (I&I) sharing programs?
3. Does your department participate in I&I sharing?
4. Identify any I&I sharing programs you have heard of or your department participates in.
5. Do you feel that sharing and receiving sensitive information is beneficial to your department and the fire service?
6. How does sharing and receiving sensitive information benefit the fire service?
7. What are any negative impacts to the fire service regarding I&I sharing programs?
8. Would you participate in a program to receive sensitive information if it was available to you?
9. Rate the importance of an I&I sharing program for your agency from extremely valuable to not at all valuable.

Finally, a survey was sent to the Chief of the Shawnee Police Department. Police Chief Rob Moser then forwarded the survey to a Kansas City Metropolitan area Police Chiefs group. Nine responses were supplied to this survey which was used to gain a law enforcement perspective on the benefit of information and intelligence sharing between fire and police. The law enforcement survey included the following six questions:

1. What is the population of your jurisdiction?
2. From a law enforcement perspective, do you see value in sharing intelligence and information with the fire service?
3. Does your agency share intelligence and information with your fire department?
4. What types of information do you share?
5. Identify any additional intelligence and information sharing programs you have knowledge of?

6. Do you have any additional comments about the value of sharing intelligence and information with fire departments?

Once the surveys had been completed, they were exported from Survey Monkey in both PDF and Excel formats. A compilation of these surveys can be found in Appendix C-E.

Limitations of the surveys used in this process include that only twenty out of sixty-eight SFD personnel completed the survey. However, an additional twenty-six surveys were completed by other fire service personnel throughout the country, including many of those from the Executive Leadership class.

Further information was gathered when the author attended the 2018 Fire Rescue International Conference. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), in conjunction with the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT), hosted a one-day symposium covering a broad spectrum of topics related to the evolving domestic and international threat picture. JCAT and NCTC both highlighted some of the products available to first responders that could help prevent, deter, or respond to terrorist attacks. Upon completion of the symposium, an interview was conducted with Captain Mathew Rush of the Austin Fire Department (AFD). Capt. Rush was instrumental in creating the foundation for AFD's role in the Austin Fusion Center as well as the Joint Terrorism Task Force in Austin. Capt. Rush described the steps he took in building the relationships with those in the law enforcement community. This trust and respect created a working relationship where information sharing became the norm instead of the exception.

Results

Five questions were used to guide the development of this ARP. The first question was what intelligence and information sharing mechanisms currently exist for fire department personnel? Through research, it was determined there were a number of different means for

members of the fire service to both receive and provide information. Some of the sources of information come from a higher Federal level and may or may not be relevant to a specific department, depending on where one is located. Some of the potential sources of intelligence and information gathering for first responders include HSIN, JCAT, and regional Fusion Centers.

One method of determining what resources are being used was through the use of surveys. To better understand the level of comprehension amongst the members of SFD regarding I&I programs, separate surveys were created for distribution to those outside of the department. Results were categorized as such. Between the survey for the SFD and the second identical survey to outside agencies, forty-six fire department personnel completed the surveys.

Respondents were asked first if they had ever heard of I&I sharing programs, secondly if their department participated in any I&I sharing programs and if so, to identify those programs. Of the 20 SFD respondents, 10, or 50% had heard of I&I sharing programs, 8 (40%) had not heard of them, and 2 (10%) were not sure what they were. Of the 26 respondents to the EFOP survey, 17 (65%), had heard of I&I programs; 7 (27%) had not; and again 2 (8%) were not sure what constituted an I&I program.

The second question asked if their department participated in I&I sharing and if so, to identify any programs they were aware of. Nineteen SFD respondents answered this question with 5 (26%) saying yes, 2 (11%) saying no, and 12 (63%) saying they were unsure. The ones who answered yes provided the following examples (acronyms were expanded on for this paper):

- Premise hazard, Shawnee Viewer Geographic Information System (GIS), Fusion Centers
- Bomb Arson Tracking System (BATS)
- DHS and FBI memos
- Premise Hazards with Emergency Communication Center (ECC) and Med-ACT

- Prior Law Enforcement experience, I was privy to privately published bulletins on criminal activity/intel.

For those who responded to the EFOP survey, 14 (54%) said their department participates, 9 (35%) said no, and 3 (11%) said they were not sure. A sampling of their responses regarding I&I sharing programs can be seen below:

- Fusion Center (10 responses mentioned Fusion Centers and were removed for brevity)
- International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA)
- Suspicious Activity Report targeted at Fire/EMS
- Being a fire marshal's office, we have the benefit of being law enforcement and fire. We have provided a means for fire departments to provide a Suspicious Activity Report that is sent to a joint law enforcement task force for further investigation/follow up. Also, a report is sent out monthly to the county fire departments from this task force providing information regarding threats, suspicious activities, etc.
- Austin Regional Intelligence Center, and Houston Real-time Criminal Intelligence Center, Houston Fusion Center
- Michigan State Police Emergency Management Intelligence Division.
- Terrorism Liaison Officers - fire department staff that are trained by law enforcement officials to assist in the dissemination of information and warnings
- I can think of a few things- locally we have a Domestic Preparedness Steering Committee that gets information out to county agencies- using our county EMA as the clearinghouse. We also have an Information sharing website for all the members of the Summit County Fire Chiefs to share fire-related information between departments.

- We share with LCRA (Lower Colorado River Authority). They have a power plant in the city that provides electricity to the regional and national grid. We also share with our COG (Council of Governments) which is ten counties for any homeland security information: courses, threats, or need to know information.

All respondents were then asked whether they thought that sharing and receiving sensitive information was beneficial to their department and the fire service in general. All 46 fire service respondents replied yes.

In a personal interview with Sergeant Mike Satter of the Kansas City Regional Fusion Center (KCRFC), the question was asked about what I&I sharing programs are available for the fire service. Sgt. Satter noted that there are specific bulletins available for fire/EMS personnel as well as the ability for some fire service personnel to gain security clearance for information sharing through the fire service analytical exchange. Another opportunity for fire/EMS is the Intelligence Liaison Officer (ILO) course hosted by the KCRFC. The ILO course is a 16-hour Course that provides an overview of the fusion center model and the programs it offers to fire/EMS personnel as well as public and private industry partners. Once individuals have gone through the class, they are then added to a distribution list relevant to their industry. These individuals will then receive emails with unclassified/for official use only (U/FOUO) information about threats to their industry.

The second question the ARP was trying to answer is what type of information could or should be shared with fire department personnel? To answer that question a third survey was sent to law enforcement agencies in the Kansas City metropolitan area, and nine responses were received. According to the responses from law enforcement (LE), there has been a reluctance in the past to share information with the fire service that may be of a sensitive nature. A question

posed to the LE group was what types of information do you share with first responders. Eight respondents replied with the following:

- Any first responder safety intel as appropriate. Information shared on unsafe conditions, etc.
- Intelligence information on residences where know violent offenders reside. Arson suspects.
- Hazard Alerts for addresses.
- Historically information has only been shared when a nexus has been determined.
Speaking for the agency as a whole. Speaking from the street cop point of view, information has been informally passed along through casual conversation.
- Unclassified, non-Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS), unless there is a known threat that could impact FD and their response to a residence or involving a known citizen.
- Case-specific
- We will share information if it may directly affect fire service (an example would be dangers of fentanyl) but will not share if it is marked "Law Enforcement Sensitive."
- We share safety issues and threats to fire service and EMS personnel such as a recent bulletin regarding Narcan-resistant fentanyl. We also share trends in terrorism and give information about indicators of terrorism for them to look for.

The third question this ARP attempted to answer was what are the benefits of an intelligence and information sharing program for the fire service? Again, the survey asked respondents how sharing sensitive information benefits the fire service. A sampling of responses can be seen

below from both the SFD survey, as well as the general fire service survey. The remainder of the responses can be found in Appendix C-E.

- Keeps everyone involved on the same page.
- It might save us from walking into a bad situation.
- Safer personnel and wiser decision making.
- We cannot prepare to respond to a threat...nor can we apply an elevated level of caution for a threat to our personnel that we do not know exists.
- Ultimately, it keeps emergency responders safer.

The biggest takeaway from the responses is that more I&I sharing increases situational awareness of possible threats, allowing first responders to better prepare to deal with those threats. It was also noted that the flow of information goes both ways. Fire service personnel can, and should, share information with local law enforcement of suspicious activity that could indicate someone is preparing for a malevolent act of any sort.

The fourth question of this ARP was what are the downsides of an intelligence and information sharing program for the fire service? Respondents from both fire department surveys answered the question, what are any negative impacts to the fire service regarding I&I sharing? Some of the responses regarding negative impacts included the following (Entirety of the survey responses can be seen in Appendix C-E):

- Desensitizing when a threat may have more validity than the background noise.
- Takes staff time to sort through
- Fire staff thinking they are pseudo law enforcement
- Concern over violation of a citizen's Fourth Amendment rights
- HIPAA violation if personal information is shared

- Information overload

The biggest concern pointed out by respondents was the safeguarding of information that was shared. Due to the sensitive nature of the material being shared, there is concern that without the proper training, policies, and procedures in place, many respondents saw the potential for sensitive information to be released, intentionally or accidentally, to the public. This was especially concerning with the prevalence of social media and the speed at which information can spread.

In a discussion with Shawnee Fire Marshal Corey Sands, he noted that himself and the other SFD investigators have all been through the 80-hour law enforcement course through the State of Kansas (personal communication, May 24th, 2018). Because they are certified as law enforcement officers, they are eligible to receive some Law Enforcement Sensitive information. Most of the information they receive is specifically related to arson-related cases and does not usually include information related to general law enforcement activity.

SFD already had several avenues of collecting sensitive information. Several chief officers received FOUO information, along with the Fire Marshal, who received LES information in addition to FOUO. The issue became the distribution of said material. To alleviate the problem, two policies were created. The first policy specified procedures related to the handling of sensitive information. The second policy provided detailed information on what suspicious activity was and how to report it to the proper authority.

Discussion

The results of the research indicate that there are several options available for information sharing, both to and from, the fire service. Though there are concerns with the type of information being shared, especially law enforcement sensitive, there was overwhelming support

for fire service involvement in I&I sharing. In fact, 100% of the fire department respondents were in favor of some level of information exchange with law enforcement (SFD and EFOP surveys, 2018).

Research indicates that Intelligence and Information sharing is important to first responders, but there are differing opinions on the level of information to be shared, especially amongst law enforcement officials. In a discussion with Captain Mathew Rush, he stated that there is no such thing as information sharing, there is only information trading (personal communication, August 2018). What he meant was that the exchange of information must go both directions. The fire service cannot expect to be on the receiving end of the sharing without reciprocating and providing something in return. Captain Rush highlighted a situation in the Austin Fusion Center in which he brought resolution to a security concern law enforcement was dealing with by providing fire service knowledge. Providing information that resolved the issue, he was able to open up the lines of communication because he, and by extension, the fire department, were seen as an asset.

This is further highlighted in discussion with Sergeant Satter in which he stated, "There has to be more integration. Training with fire service and EMS personnel is key. It gives all first responders the opportunity to establish relationships with one another and learn everyone's roles, responsibilities, and capabilities for future responses" (Satter, personal communication, June 25th, 2018). Satter went on to say, "There needs to be a concerted effort to have the fire service and EMS work more with the Kansas City Regional Fusion Center, and this requires time, manpower, and access to get this done."

There are obvious concerns from both the first responder, as well as the law enforcement side when it comes to determining what information is shared. One of the concerns is the

classification level of the information being shared. Most fire department personnel do not have any type of security clearance and are therefore not legally allowed to view the material. For example, one law enforcement survey response stated, "We will share information if it may directly affect fire service (an example would be dangers of fentanyl) but will not share if it is marked 'Law Enforcement Sensitive'" (LE survey, 2018).

With the Shawnee Fire Marshal and investigators having access to LES information already, it would be worth working with him to expand the program and develop a Standard Operating Procedure outlining the requirements for sharing information with the crews. To date, there has not been a policy in place that specifies the rules on information sharing with the firefighters and officers that do not have clearance to receive LES information. Even if there were a significant event where LES information is relevant to the on-going operations of the fire department, it would likely get shared with Chief Staff, but there is no accountability for what happens to the information after it is shared. Maintaining confidentiality of sensitive information is critical to avoid violating any non-disclosure act that has been signed with the KCRFC.

One issue of interest was the differing views on fire service involvement in suspicious activity reporting on citizens who may or may not be plotting an action that could harm other people. One FD respondent expressed concerns by saying,

Some potential legal concerns have been identified which include violation of citizens' 4th amendment rights. Also, I&I sharing must be calculated in regards to fire service involvement; the fire service should not be used for gathering intel on terrorists or suspected terrorists. With proper training, I&I programs are beneficial to the fire service and pose little legal risk (SFD Survey, 2018).

Conversely, a respondent to the LE survey noted that it could be beneficial to have the fire service providing specific information, saying, “fire service and EMS personnel can be the eyes and ears for law enforcement due to the access they have at times that law enforcement does not” (LE Survey, 2018). While it is true that first responders sometimes get access to places law enforcement doesn’t, that does not automatically mean that first responders should be reporting every little item of suspicion they see. The fire service is allowed access to these places because they have the trust of the people. By violating this trust on a regular basis, the fire service risks losing that trusted status and increases the likelihood of being viewed through the same lens as LE Officers are often viewed. The fire service would be doing itself a disservice by eroding the public trust.

However, there may be circumstances in which first responders gain access into someone’s private space and unintentionally come across suspicious materials that could lead them to believe there is an imminent threat. In those situations, it would be prudent to report their suspicions to the proper authorities such as local law enforcement or the local Fusion Center. Another option would be to report to the National Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) hotline established by the Department of Homeland Security. Before implementing a SAR program, it would be imperative to establish a policy and provide training to all members of the department to ensure the aforementioned violations of Civil Liberties are protected. Reporting should only be done on suspicious activities, not race, ethnicity, or religion (DHS, 2018).

One of the big hurdles that most first responders encounter when trying to gain access to intelligence or sensitive information is the classification level of the information. Anything above For Official Use Only (FOUO) is not able to be disseminated without special clearance, which most first responders don’t have. Even with FOUO information, special precautions need

to be taken to ensure the information is safeguarded. According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Classification Guide, FOUO is not to be distributed to unauthorized personnel. The ODNI Classification Guide specifies that "Though a security clearance is not required, the provision of FOUO is based on need to know or mission need" (ODNI, 2018, p. 63). The ODNI also has specific instructions for what information can be classified and at what level. Though there seem to be some liberties taken by the Federal Government regarding the information deemed necessary to classify.

In a 2007 report by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), they claimed "Excessive secrecy on the part of the federal government also appears to be thwarting the fundamental aim of fusion centers, which is the prevention of terrorism through the coordination of state, local and federal information" (German and Stanley). The 9-11 Commission noted that security requirements at the time lead to "over-classification and excessive compartmentalization of information amongst agencies" (9-11 Commission, 2004, p. 417). The report went on to recommend, "Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge" (9-11 Commission, 2004, p. 417).

The question then becomes, is developing an information and intelligence sharing program of value to the Shawnee Fire Department? Is it worth the hassle of having everyone sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA)? How does the fire service, and specifically the Shawnee Fire Department, go about distributing sensitive information and ensuring it remains protected? In speaking with Chief Weyand, his department has several policies in place describing what can and cannot be shared, and how sensitive information is distributed. To get around the need for every employee to sign an NDA, their information sharing takes place through their Intranet, a password protected, internal website.

Recommendations

The purpose of this ARP was to determine what options existed for the sharing of sensitive intelligence and information within the fire service and specifically within the Shawnee Fire Department. This ARP also asked the question regarding what types of information should be shared, what the positive and negative aspects of information sharing were, and whether the SFD should consider the development of an Intelligence and Information sharing program. Upon completion of the research for this ARP, there are several recommendations concerning the development of an I&I sharing program for the SFD.

The first recommendation is for the Shawnee Fire Department should consider the creation of an Information and Intelligence sharing program. With 100% of SFD and EFO survey respondents saying that receiving sensitive information would be beneficial for their department, it seems that there is a hunger for knowledge that could give the fire department a leg up in responding to calls that could present as a hostile situation (SFD & EFO surveys, 2018). This program will be driven by policies and procedures that will outline what information can be shared, who it can be shared with, and how it should be stored.

As part of this ARP, two policies were developed to provide guidance on the subject of information sharing. One policy outlined the steps necessary for suspicious activity reporting in which firefighters are reporting back to the Shawnee Police and the Kansas City Regional Fusion Center regarding potentially suspicious activity. An example of this could include responding to an EMS call and noticing bomb-making materials that most ordinary people would not have just lying around.

The second policy outlined the responsibilities of handling sensitive information. This policy was developed to guide fire department members in the dissemination of intelligence and

information documents, as needed, for the sole purpose of offering situational awareness to personnel concerning local, state, national and international events and trends. As mentioned previously, the Fire Marshal Sands and the other SFD Investigators have access to LES information. Utilizing their access to information in conjunction with a policy on how to handle and distribute that information could provide the means of developing greater situational awareness amongst SFD members.

The second recommendation is to develop training for all members of the Shawnee Fire Department who will be partaking in the retention and dissemination of sensitive information and documentation. It is further recommended that this training is presented on an annual basis as a refresher for all personnel, but also include this information as part of an on-boarding process for new hires. It is essential that training accompany the creation of policies and procedures to ensure everyone is aware of their responsibilities in maintaining the security of the information presented with the FOUO or LES designation.

Following up the department sponsored training, additional training could come in the form of an Intelligence Liaison Officer (ILO) class. This class is sponsored by the KCRFC and provides students with a better understanding of the fusion center concept. In addition to providing the background on what information can and cannot be shared, it also provides the student with information about threats, hazards, and groups both national and international, that are known to pose a risk. The author was fortunate to attend such a class, and it provided valuable knowledge on topics such as homegrown terrorism, international terrorism, improvised explosive device awareness, and information about the "See something, Say something" campaign.

The final recommendation is for the fire service, and specifically, the Shawnee Fire Department, to get more involved with the local fusion center. The KCRFC assimilates much of the information related to local threats and turns it into credible intelligence. The fire service plays an important role in that process. By having SFD personnel involved in the KCRFC, relationships are developed that facilitates the cross-discipline sharing of information.

With the ever-evolving threat environment, the fire service must remain vigilant and keep abreast of the potential hazards. It is imperative that fire and emergency services are developing relationships with local and federal law enforcement agencies before a hostile event occurs. Developing these relationships will be a decisive factor in improving the response to a hostile event. It is only through the continual improvement of processes to share information and work together that we will improve outcomes and work towards eliminating the threat of intentional mass casualty events.

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Appendix A



Shawnee Fire Department Operating Policies and Guidelines

Current Policy Date:		Policy No.:	Total Number of Pages: 4
Supersedes Policy Issuance Dates:			
Original Policy Issuance Date:		Date of last review:	
Subject: Handling Sensitive Unclassified Information			
Summary: Outlines the responsibilities and procedures for handling of intelligence documents produced by SFD or any other local, state or federal entity.		Approved: Fire Chief John Mattox	
Category: Administration			
Self-Assessment References:			

I. SCOPE / PURPOSE

This APG is concerned with documents that are labeled unclassified, but are sensitive in nature - meaning, personnel must have a need-to-know. There are certain federal procedures for handling unclassified information set forth in this policy.

II. ROLE/RESPONSIBILITY

This SOG establishes mandatory requirements for all Shawnee Fire Department (SFD) personnel regarding the identification, access, dissemination, and handling of intelligence documents produced by SFD or any other local, state or federal entity.

It is the responsibility of all members of the department to understand that the intent of this SOG is to provide guidance on handling sensitive unclassified information.

III. DEFINITIONS

Approved fire department members

- Approved fire department members shall be defined as any member of the department that is a certified Intelligence Liaison Officer or member within the Homeland Security/Emergency Management (HSEM) unit that has been given approval to disseminate sensitive unclassified information.

Unclassified//For Official Use Only (U//FOUO)

- U//FOUO is the designation used to identify sensitive but unclassified information within the homeland security community. The unauthorized disclosure of U//FOUO documents may adversely impact a person's privacy or welfare, the conduct of Federal programs or other operations essential to the national interest, or information that is not otherwise covered by a statute or regulation. You may also see the term Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU).
- U//FOUO documents are NOT disseminated to the general public; rather, only to those personnel determined to have a need-to-know. U//FOUO classification may exempt mandatory release of the document to the public under the Freedom of Information Act.
- The document is clearly marked Unclassified//For Official Use Only (U//FOUO).
- The large majority of products that will be disseminated to OFD personnel will be

U//FOUO and may come from any number of sources.

Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES)

- LES designation is applied to information related to an ongoing criminal investigation. This designation does not limit information sharing with SFD personnel with a need-to-know of that information. However, LES may contain information that identifies the names of persons (e.g. undercover law enforcement, suspects, etc.) involved in an investigation and/or details about the investigation. Therefore, the approved fire department member, after consultation with law enforcement partners, will typically remove most LES details prior to disseminating information.
- LES documents are NOT disseminated to the public; rather, only those personnel determined to have a need-to-know. LES classification may exempt mandatory release of the document to the public under the Freedom of Information Act.
- Typically, LES documents will be converted to U//FOUO prior to dissemination.

Need-to-know

- Need-to-know is the determination made by the agency responsible for creating the document that access is required for the performance of official duties. SFD personnel

have need-to-know access for U//FOUO documents. LES documents are more restricted and the need-to-know is determined on a case-by-case basis.

IV. GUIDELINE

Approved fire department members will disseminate intelligence and information documents, as needed, for the sole purpose of offering situational awareness to personnel concerning local, state, national and international events and trends. Members shall use these documents for situational awareness in the course of their daily duties. Members will ensure the information is safe guarded to the appropriate level and standard.

Access and Dissemination of Sensitive Unclassified Information

- U//FOUO and LES documents will be vetted and disseminated to SFD personnel as necessary by approved fire department members. Bulletins that affect specific Divisions may only be disseminated to those Divisions (e.g. Operations, Emergency Management, Senior Management Team, Prevention, etc.).
- U//FOUO and LES documents will be delivered, viewed and secured at all times to safeguard information contained within the documents.
- All Chief Officers will receive email notification of time sensitive U//FOUO and LES documents in order to ensure personnel receive the information immediately.
- If requested, approved fire department members may send links to U//FOUO and LES documents electronically to official city email accounts only, and only as needed.

Handling of Sensitive Unclassified Information

- All SFD uniformed personnel have a need-to-know and access to U//FOUO documents. The need to-know for LES documents will be on a case-by-case basis.
- A security clearance is not needed to access U//FOUO or LES documents. Access is determined by the lead agency that produced the information. Where there is uncertainty as to a person's need-to-know, personnel shall request dissemination instructions from approved fire department members.
- U//FOUO documents may be shared with other local, state, and federal agencies, private organizations, and city officials provided a need-to-know has been established and the information is shared in an official governmental capacity.
- LES information may NOT be shared with other agencies until cleared by the approved fire department members.

- U//FOUO and LES documents shall NOT be sent to personal email accounts. Do NOT enter or post any U//FOUO information on any public website, social media outlet, or at any fire station.

Storage and Destruction of Sensitive Unclassified Information

- Fire stations are not considered secure environments for storing U//FOUO or LES documents. Therefore, U//FOUO and LES documents will be posted, viewed and catalogued on PowerDMS in a locked PDF format to prevent copying or printing.
- Federal requirements mandate unattended U//FOUO and LES documents shall be stored in a locked filing cabinet, locked desk drawer, or locked storage compartment. Documents can also be stored in a room or area that has sufficient physical access control measures to afford adequate protection and prevent unauthorized access by members of the public or persons without a need-to-know. Included is such as a room or area where access is controlled by a guard, lock, or card reader.
- If U//FOUO or LES hard-copy documents are produced they will be destroyed by shredding, pulping, or pulverizing sufficient to assure destruction beyond recognition and reconstruction. After destruction, materials may be discarded in the appropriate trash receptacle.

Appendix B



Shawnee Fire Department Operating Policies and Guidelines

Current Policy Date:		Policy No.:	Total Number of Pages: 4
Supersedes Policy Issuance Dates:			
Original Policy Issuance Date:		Date of last review:	
Subject: Suspicious Activity Reporting			
Summary: Provide guidance and direction for reporting suspicious activities.		Approved:	
Category: Administration			
Self-Assessment References:			

- I. **PURPOSE:** To provide guidance in reporting certain types of suspicious activities to law enforcement and intelligence authorities in order to assist in identifying behaviors and/or criminal activity that may potentially be related to terrorism.
- II. **ROLE / RESPONSIBILITY:** All members are responsible to act in accordance with this SOG. As members of the Fire Department, we play a vital role in the reporting of suspicious activity.
- III. **REPORTING PROCEDURE:** Suspicious activity can be reported through different mechanisms. The method of reporting will primarily be dictated by the perceived threat and the credibility of that threat. If the threat is believed to be an urgent or credible concern, it should be reported immediately to the battalion chief. Other activity that may not be considered immediate can be reported through other mechanisms described below. Regardless of classification, it is imperative that any suspicious activity be reported.

A Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) should be submitted when personnel observe activity

that may be related to criminal activity or terrorism.

An individual who files a SAR should contact Shawnee Police Department to document the incident. This will help ensure that any information that may be time sensitive gets disseminated as quickly as possible.

IV. THREAT LEVELS

Level 1 – A highly suspicious situation whereby multiple threat assessment factors are present and the probability exists that this is not an accident, prank, misunderstanding, or a part of normal operations. If the situation at the scene poses an immediate risk to life, the appropriate resources should be requested and steps should be taken to mitigate the hazard as dictated by the circumstances at hand.

Immediate notification shall be made to the Battalion Chief who shall share the information immediately with the Emergency Services Chief and the Deputy Chief. It will be the responsibility of the Emergency Services Chief to make notification to the Shawnee Police Department (SPD) and/or the Kansas City Regional Fusion Center (KCRFC). If unavailable, the Deputy Chief will make the notifications. In most cases a SAR will be required.

Level 2 – A slightly suspicious situation whereby several threat assessment factors may be present; however, there is no immediate threat.

If there is any uncertainty as to the suspicion or threat, the unit may contact their immediate supervisor to discuss the situation further. At a minimum this situation or circumstance should be reported utilizing the SAR.

Level 3 – A slightly suspicious situation whereby one or more threat assessment factors may be present; however, there is no immediate threat. The likelihood is good that it is an accident, prank, misunderstanding or a part of normal operations. At a minimum this situation or circumstance should be reported utilizing the SAR.

- **If something seems "wrong", "out of place", feels "odd" and even if you cannot put a finger on the reason..... REPORT IT!!!**

V. INFORMATION REQUIRED

The more comprehensive the information provided, the quicker and more detailed the follow-up investigation. Information requested on the SAR form will include:

- Location – provide an exact location and property type
- Time – provide date, time, and duration of the activity
- People or suspicious parties – gender, age, race, and physical descriptions (height,

- weight, build, hair color, clothing etc.)
- Activity – describes what is/was taking place
- Vehicle – make/model, color, license plate/state, other descriptors
- Other Information – suspicious equipment, weapons, suspicious occupants, etc.

The Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) form should be completed on the KCRFC website www.kctew.org/reports.htm.

A copy should be printed and sent through the chain of command to the Emergency Services Chief using a confidential inter-departmental envelope.

VI. PRIVACY AND RECORD KEEPING

The privacy of individuals and respect for the inherent freedoms guaranteed in this country require a high degree of caution in how we report and keep records of suspicious activity.

The following rules apply to Suspicious Activity Reporting:

- All submitted SAR forms will be kept by the KCRFC in accordance with applicable laws and regulations
- Personnel will NOT keep copies of submitted SAR forms
- Personnel will NOT make journal entries regarding details concerning notification of a suspicious activity
- Reporting of activities observed while inside person's homes and businesses should be limited to clear criminal or terrorism related activity and the situations described above
- In all cases, it is inappropriate to report suspicious activity based solely on a person's skin color, dress, or religious affiliation. Reported activity MUST be based on a describable observation, behavior, or action

SAR GUIDANCE	
DEFINED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AND POTENTIAL TERRORISM NEXUS ACTIVITY	
Breach/ Attempted Intrusion	Unauthorized personnel attempting to or actually entering a restricted area or protected site. Impersonation of authorized personnel (e.g. police/fire, security, janitor)
Misrepresentation	Presenting false or misusing insignia, documents, and/or identification, to misrepresent one's affiliation to cover possible illicit activity.
Theft/Loss/Diversion	Stealing or diverting something associated with a facility/infrastructure (e.g., badges, uniforms, identification, emergency vehicles, technology or documents {classified or unclassified}, which are proprietary to the facility).
Sabotage/Tampering/Vandalism	Damaging, manipulating, or defacing part of a facility/infrastructure or protected site
Cyber Attack	Compromising, or attempting to compromise or disrupt an organization's information technology infrastructure.


Expressed or Implied Threat	Communicating a spoken or written threat to damage or compromise a facility/infrastructure
Aviation Activity	Operation of an aircraft in a manner that reasonably may be interpreted as suspicious, or posing a threat to people or property. Such operation may or may not be a violation of Federal Aviation Regulations
POTENTIAL CRIMINAL OR NON-CRIMINAL ACTIVITY REQUIRING ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION	
Eliciting Information	Questioning individuals at a level beyond mere curiosity about particular facets of a facility's or building's purpose, operations, security procedures, etc., that would arouse suspicion in a reasonable person
Testing or Probing of Security	Deliberate interactions with, or challenges to, installations, personnel, or systems that reveal physical, personnel or cyber security capabilities
Recruiting	Building of operations teams and contacts, personnel data, banking data or travel data
Photography	Taking pictures or video of facilities, buildings, or infrastructure in a manner that would arouse suspicion in a reasonable person. Examples include taking pictures or video of infrequently used access points, personnel performing security functions (patrols, badge/vehicle checking), security-related
Observation/Surveillance	Demonstrating unusual interest in facilities, buildings, or infrastructure beyond mere casual or professional (e.g. engineers) interest such that a reasonable person would consider the activity suspicious. Examples include observation through binoculars, taking notes, attempting to measure distances, etc.
Materials Acquisition/Storage	Acquisition and/or storage of unusual quantities of materials such as cell phones, pagers, fuel, chemicals, toxic materials, and timers, such that a reasonable person would suspect possible criminal activity.
Acquisition of Expertise	Attempts to obtain or conduct training in security concepts; military weapons or tactics; or other unusual capabilities that would arouse suspicion in a reasonable person.
Weapons Discovery	Discovery of unusual amounts of weapons or explosives that would arouse suspicion in a reasonable person.
Sector-Specific Incident	Actions associated with a characteristic of unique concern to specific sectors (such as the public health sector), with regard to their personnel, facilities, systems

Appendix C

Included in this appendix are the responses to the survey questions. Three surveys were collected. One survey to SFD members to ascertain their level of knowledge about the subject, one to other fire service members to get national perspective, and one to law enforcement officers. Data from all three surveys are represented in Appendices C-E in their entirety.

Shawnee Fire Department Survey:


Q1 Have you ever heard of intelligence and information (I&I) sharing programs?



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Yes	50.00%	10
No	40.00%	8
Not sure what that is	10.00%	2
TOTAL		20

Q2 Does your department participate in I&I sharing?

Answered: 19 Skipped: 1



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Yes	26.32%	5
No	10.53%	2
Not sure	63.16%	12
TOTAL		19


Q3 Identify any I&I sharing programs you have heard of or your department participates in.

Answered: 15 Skipped: 5

- Premise hazard, Shawnee Viewer (GIS), Fusion Centers
- N/A
- NA
- NFIRS, BATS
- DHS and FBI memos
- I don't know
- n/a
- Premise Hazards with ECC and Med-ACT
- n/a
- Not sure what this entails.
- I have not heard of any.
- N/A
- Prior LE experience, I was privy to privately published bulletins on criminal activity/intel.

Q4 Do you feel that sharing and receiving sensitive information is beneficial to your department and/or the fire service?

Answered: 20 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Yes	100.00%	20
No	0.00%	0
Not sure	0.00%	0
TOTAL		20

Q5 How does sharing and receiving sensitive information benefit the fire service?

Answered: 19 Skipped: 1

- Information on potentially dangerous subjects is useful. Clean information for non-law enforcement on potential threats are also useful.
- Have more information to help make better decisions when the time arises especially with sensitive matters.
- Crucial information is shared daily on many of the alarms we run and information from our police and dispatch center keep us safe and up to date
- Keeps everyone involved and on the same page.
- It might save us from walking into a bad situation
- We can all learn from others, pushes us to do well so we share positive data
- Sharing and receiving sensitive information increases the safety of all responders through increased situational awareness.
- so as we can be aware of potential hazards or risks regarding certain situations.
- safer personnel and wiser decision making
- It allows responders to receive vital information on the way to a call.
- Makes everyone aware of the situation.
- Depending on what it is about and if it concerns others and their safety.

- Starters; it could help keep people aware of potential threats only law enforcement personnel are privy too.
- I can possibly help all first responder's safety when conducting operations or responding to emergency incidents.
- Helps keep the department informed
- Having open lines of communication between departments allows us to assist them more effectively and them to assist us in the same manner when it comes to scenarios that involve more than one department.
- It provides a common operating picture for public safety
- Awareness and safety for personnel, allows all involved to prepare
- Dangerous activity/address threats, trends in local activity, terrorism bulletins


Q6 What are any negative impacts to the fire service regarding I&I sharing programs?

Answered: 18 Skipped: 2

- Law enforcement sensitive information could possibly be sent out and jeopardize officer safety. Non-vetted information being distributed and creating bias and complacency.
- Information overload.
- n/a
- None that I can think of.
- Not sure
- Some potential legal concerns have been identified which include violation of citizens' 4th amendment rights. Also, I&I sharing must be calculated in regards to fire service involvement; the fire service should not be used for gathering intel on terrorists or suspected terrorists. With proper training, I&I programs are beneficial to the fire service and pose little legal risk.
- perhaps sensitive information falling into the wrong hands
- n/a
- Keeping information up to date.
- If it comes from multiple individual's info cannot be correct.
- HIPPA violations and other personal information.
- The usual with any information, the potential to be distorted and warped by the rumor mill.
- unknown
- I don't know
- Potential for sensitive info to be released early
- It can be dangerous for responding personnel, and could hamper preparation
- Keeping data FOUO, increased speculation/sensationalism from line members.
- Keeping information in the proper hands.

Q7 Would you participate in a program to receive sensitive information if it was available to you?


Answered: 20 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Yes	95.00%	19
No	5.00%	1
TOTAL		20

Q8 Rate the importance of an I&I sharing program for your agency.

Answered: 20 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Extremely valuable	30.00%	6
Very valuable	35.00%	7
Somewhat valuable	30.00%	6
Not so valuable	0.00%	0
Not at all valuable	0.00%	0
Other (please specify)	5.00%	1
TOTAL		20

Q9 Please add any additional comments regarding I&I sharing in the fire service.


Answered: 7 Skipped: 13

- The correct information is important. Information must be stripped of LEO sensitive information without watering down the pertinent information for the fire service.
- N/A
- n/a
- n/a
- n/a
- I think if we knew more about what exactly I&I sharing was and how it would benefit the fire service, we might consider it.
- N/A

Appendix D


Executive Fire Officer Program Survey:

Q1 What is the population of the jurisdiction your department serves?



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES
0-29,999	19.23% 5
30,000-74,999	23.08% 6
75,000-119,999	11.54% 3
120,000 +	46.15% 12
TOTAL	26


Q2 Have you ever heard of intelligence and information (I&I) sharing programs?



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES
Yes	65.38% 17
No	26.92% 7
Not sure what that is	7.69% 2
TOTAL	26

Q3 Does your department participate in I&I sharing?

Answered: 26 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Yes	53.85%	14
No	34.62%	9
Not sure	11.54%	3
TOTAL		26

Q4 Identify any I&I sharing programs you have heard of or your department participates in.


Answered: 23 Skipped: 3

- Fusion Center
- International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) FBI Fusion Center Suspicious Activity Report targeted at Fire/EMS
- Being a fire marshal's office, we have the benefit of being law enforcement and fire. We have provided a means for fire departments to provide a Suspicious Activity Report that is sent to a joint law enforcement task force for further investigation/follow up. Also, a report is sent out monthly to the county fire departments from this task force providing information regarding threats, suspicious activities, etc.
- Several departments in the state have stood up a full time or part time "fusion center" to allow for a more free flow of information between LE and FD/EMS agencies. Houston has one but the FD does not truly participate.
- Austin Regional Intelligence Center, and Houston Real-time Criminal Intelligence Center, Houston Fusion Center
- For large special events, we work with law enforcement. Also shared info from the county.
- N/A

- There is information sharing when dignitaries come into town. We have had many political dignitaries (including the president) that have staid in our city. That is really the only time there is limited information sharing,
- Matt, give me a call if you need to know more about our homeland security unit, fusion center liaison, and/or intelligence sharing process here at the OFD. Weyand
- na
- Law enforcement fusion center.
- Heroin overdose
- Not sure. We do train together with partners
- Have not really heard of this.
- We have one TLO
- Michigan State Police Emergency Management Intelligence Division.
- Terrorism Liaison Officers - fire department staff that are trained by law enforcement officials to assist in the dissemination of information and warnings
- I can think of a few things- locally we have a Domestic Preparedness Steering Committee that gets information out to county agencies- using our county EMA as the clearinghouse. We also have and Information sharing website for all the members of the Summit County Fire Chiefs to share fire related information between departments. On a broader scale, we all receive regular updates from the Northeast Ohio Fusion Center, which is part of the Homeland Security network.
- Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC)
- We receive information from our Fusion Center as well as our PD.
- We share with LCRA (Lower Colorado River Authority). They have a power plant in the city that provides electricity to the regional and national grid. We also share with our COG (Council of Governments) which is 10 counties for any homeland security information: courses, threats, or need to know information.
- NETWS?

Q5 Do you feel that sharing and receiving sensitive information is beneficial to your department and/or the fire service?

Answered: 26 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Yes	100.00%	26
No	0.00%	0
Not sure	0.00%	0
TOTAL		26

Q6 How does sharing and receiving sensitive information benefit the fire service?

Answered: 23 Skipped: 3

- Provides an opportunity to increase situational awareness when specific information is obtained and shared.
- Enhances first responder safety with information was previously compartmentalized for law enforcement only. Increases the number of personnel to receive, report, and interpret potential intelligence items. Allows for a better integration of fire into law enforcement.
- I believe that some information should be shared with the fire service to provide a level of awareness to increase safety. Also, the fire service is another outlet to provide information to law enforcement on suspicious activities. If firefighters have an idea of what kinds of things to look for, they are more likely to notice something and report it. The public is also less suspicious and more trusting of the fire department so they will let their guard down more than with the presence of police so they may have an opportunity to see something suspicious/criminal in nature.
- To over simplify a very multifaceted answer, we cannot prepare to respond to a threat on our jurisdiction nor can we apply an elevated level of caution for a threat to our personnel that we do not know exists.
- Prepares your troops for the potential. Very similar to Engine or Ladder Companies familiarizing themselves with commercial structures under construction or pre-incident planning.

- We need it for managing large special events and deployments.
- Make you aware of any threats that may exist.
- It assist in the prevention and preparedness function of what we do. It can also assist the mitigation aspect of an event incase there were to be an incident.
- Ultimately, it keeps emergency responders safer. By having an increased level of situational awareness to trending homeland security issues, emergency responders can better understand job-related risks/threats, which in the end, helps them make better decisions.
- Heightened awareness of possible threats makes us more prepared.
- Not much, but has led to greater community health
- Eliminates duplication, higher level of safety for responders, more informed decisions
- Allows us to learn from others incidents, both good and bad.
- Better situational awareness
- Provides valuable intelligence/data to assist in community risk assessments during mass gathering events. Intelligence sources from local, state and federal law enforcement agencies provide a collaborative collection and synthesized dissemination of intelligence.
- Heighten sense of awareness and increased situational awareness. Plus builds networking for potential serious natured calls
- Sharing information allows us to keep informed on things happening up and down the pipeline, from the local level to the federal level. This information is received in "almost" real time, allow decisions to be made on information that is more accurate.
- Provides all-hazards information approach
- Better service Safety
- Keeps everyone in the know of what is going on. The threats affect the fire service just as much as law enforcement.
- It provides an ability for preparation for low frequency high risk incidents. It also shares the ability for cross training and understanding various agencies responsibilities. Helps us work toward a more unified and comprehensive response team.
- Prevents duplication of effort or the efforts of one person from causing problems with the efforts of another. The more we share information the more we can help each other.
- Keeps people safer. See something say something. We can then share any information we have with the proper authorities

Q7 What are any negative impacts to the fire service regarding I&I sharing programs?


Answered: 23 Skipped: 3

- A possibility of sensitive information being share outside of public safety.
- Social media and loose lips.
- The potential for sensitive information to be shared and made public.
- I see no direct negatives for information sharing with the fire service. that said, I do recognize the negative potential of sensitive information winding up on social media if information is shared in too cavalier a manner.

- Social media and members who do not know how to sensor themselves.
- The word can get out. Must stay confidential.
- N/A
- Information sharing is imperative and believe it happens at different levels. As in my City the police do not often like to share to much information with the fire department.
- None, but firefighters do have to learn how to safeguard intelligence (U/FOUO documents)
- Desensitizing when a threat might have more validity than the background noise.
- duplication in reporting requirements
- Sensitive info could be given to wrong people, storage concerns, privacy issues
- N/A
- Takes staff time
- Not being included in the dissemination of such intelligence sharing opportunities. Fortunately, AAFD is included not only in the dissemination of intelligence, but the event preparation as well.
- Some fire staff believe they are pseudo law officers - we receive a lot of forwarded briefings and staff begins to ignore the briefing
- The only negative is that sometimes there is actually too much information. A lot of what we receive is not vetted, so it is up to us to decide what is pertinent and what is not.
- Desensitivity to information provided.
- Information leaks
- We like to talk in the fire service so sensitive information could get out.
- There are always those individuals that can destroy a good working relationship between agencies or that go rogue.
- Someone may use that information to block your attempts in completing an objective.
- Time sensitivity could be an issues

Q8 Would you participate in a program to receive sensitive information if it was available to you?


Answered: 25 Skipped: 1



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Yes	100.00%	25
No	0.00%	0
TOTAL		25

Q9 Rate the importance of an I&I sharing program for your agency.

Answered: 26 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Extremely valuable	42.31%	11
Very valuable	23.08%	6
Somewhat valuable	34.62%	9
Not so valuable	0.00%	0
Not at all valuable	0.00%	0
Other (please specify)	0.00%	0
TOTAL		26

Q10 Please add any additional comments regarding I&I sharing in the fire service.

Answered: 11 Skipped: 15

- The need for I&I information will continue to grow as society changes.
- I&I is absolutely vital at the upper levels of the agency. Being privy to potential threats can steer decision making (i.e. training). While the rank & file membership may not understand additional training evolutions in a given discipline, the rewards of preparedness are too numerous to count.
- Thank you and good luck!
- This is a great topic, I think I&I is often an afterthought. Good luck.
- Good luck matt
- Sharing of intelligence and information is critical. It's essential the intelligence and information is in real time and relevant to the event or incident.


- If you need an interviewee let me know Matt. jkos@gvfire.org
- Interesting topic- good luck!
- I would like to see more information targeted towards the fire service and less towards law enforcement.
- Certain information is of no need to be shared, but potential threats that affect the lives of responding fire service personnel should be shared.

Appendix E

Law Enforcement Survey:

Q1 What is the population of the jurisdiction you serve?


Answered: 9 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
0-29,999	44.44%	4
30,000-74,999	22.22%	2
75,000-119,999	0.00%	0
120,000 +	33.33%	3
TOTAL		9

Q2 From a Law Enforcement perspective, do you see value in sharing Information and Intelligence (I&I) with the fire service?


Answered: 9 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Yes	44.44%	4
No	11.11%	1
Depends	44.44%	4
TOTAL		9

Q3 Does your agency share I&I with your Fire Department?

Answered: 9 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Yes	77.78%	7
No	22.22%	2
TOTAL		9

Q4 What types of information do you share?

Answered: 9 Skipped: 0

- Any first responder safety intel as appropriate. information shared on unsafe conditions, etc.
- Intelligence information on residences where know violent offenders reside. Arson suspects.
- Hazard Alerts for addresses.
- Historically information has only been shared when a nexus has been determined. Speaking for the agency as a whole. Speaking from the street cop point of view, information has been informally passed along through casual conversation.
- Unclassified, non-CJIS, unless there is a known threat that could impact FD and their response to a residence or involving a known citizen
- Case specific
- We will share information if it may directly affect fire service (example would be dangers of fentanyl) but will not share if it is marked "Law Enforcement Sensitive".
- We share safety issues and threats to fire service and EMS personnel such as a recent bulletin regarding Narcan-resistant fentanyl. We also share trends in terrorism and give information of indicators of terrorism for them to look for.

Q5 Identify any additional I&I sharing programs you have knowledge of.

Answered: 8 Skipped: 1

- Nothing formal
- None.
- We have numerous sources of I&I sharing from the Federal level all the way down to the Municipal PD level.
- No
- FD and PD attend KCTEW briefings for updates, so that becomes shared knowledge.
- I assume the Regional Fusion Centers share information with FD's.
- We offer an Intelligence Liaison Officer training program and it is offered to fire service and EMS service personnel.

Q6 Do you have any additional comments about the value or need for I&I sharing with fire departments?

Answered: 6 Skipped: 3

- No.
- Sharing with the Fire Service/EMS is probably long overdue. Law Enforcement sits on information that could potentially benefit Fire/EMS and vice versa. If Fire/EMS responds to a residence or business that we know is a hot bed of activity an unnecessary risk is being taken by responding units. Fire and Rescue may be granted access to a home or business that law enforcement would be barred from entering because suspects do not think of Fire/EMS as potential agents working in conjunction with Law Enforcement.
- No.
- I do not think fire services should have access to criminal intelligence unless it is case specific or the individual is assigned to a task force.
- Because of the delicate rules that limit distribution of sensitive material, I think police departments will not typically share information w/ FD's unless it is open to the public.
- Fire service and EMS personnel can be the eyes and ears for law enforcement due to the access they have at times that law enforcement does not. The importance in sharing I&I is not only for their safety but the safety of all as they routinely respond to the same incidents with law enforcement. By sharing information as a collective first responder force, it increases the ability of information gathering and is a force multiplier in the intelligence community.