

Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Fire Service
Response to Civil Unrest Incidents

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EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FIRE SERVICE

CERTIFICATION STATEMENT

I hereby certify that this paper constitutes my own product, that where the language of others is set forth, quotations marks so indicate, and that appropriate credit is given where I have used the language, ideas, expressions, or writings of another.

Signed: Kwame Cooper

Abstract

The purpose of this Applied Research Project was to analyze the operational effectiveness of the fire service response to civil unrest and violent incidents. The focus of the research was on fire and police departments use of Incident Command, Unified Command and National Incident Management Systems.

The problem is when responding to civil unrest incidents, the fire service does not know the level of preparedness in operating cooperatively with law enforcement departments.

Action research methodology was used to answer 3 research questions:

- 1) How effective is the fire service in developing and implementing positive relationships in the communities they serve?
- 2) What are some of the contributing factors in communities that lead to civil unrest incidents?
- 3) Does the fire service effectively operate with law enforcement agencies during civil unrest incidents?

The procedure used in this study included; research, literature review, review of agency operations, analysis of empirical studies and reports on civil unrest, on-line survey distribution, collection and analysis of results.

The recommendations from the findings of this research include; complete a vulnerability assessment of operational effectiveness, develop policies and procedures for civil unrest incidents, coordinate table-top exercise with public safety departments, establish an interoperability system for firefighters and police officers and establish authentic relationships with local firefighters and community residents.

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Introduction

Whether it is called civil unrest, civil disturbance, a rebellion, uprising, riot or insurrection, these types of continued events through the United States sound a distressing alarm concerning a significant social discourse in many urban communities. According to Braha (2012), contributing factors that fuel these events begin slowly and occur when economic, political, racial and ethnic tensions, changing demographics and social stress suddenly erupt into civil unrest. Many times, these outcomes lead to political, social and cultural changes (Braha, 2012).

Over the past two decades, there have been many significant changes in the fire and emergency services profession that impact preparation, response and mitigation. Incidents involving law enforcement and members of the community have resulted in violence which required an emergency response from firefighters to treat medical patients or other types of incidents. Therefore, strategies toward preparedness, collaboration and change management are essential for the Fire Service leaders to continue their efforts to achieve. As new challenges continue to emerge involving domestic violence, civil unrest and terrorism, Fire Service leaders are faced with developing new innovative strategies to respond to these issues.

Currently in the United States (US) there are approximately 30,145 fire departments, comprising 1,100,450 sworn and volunteer firefighters, protecting 318.9 million people. Incident Command (IC), unified command (UC), and community relations have shifted to top priorities in many fire departments throughout the country. According to a recent collaborative study by the National Fire Protection Association, United States Fire Administration, and the International Association of Firefighters entitled: *Civil Unrest*, the Fire Service and law

enforcement must continue to work together in preparation and in response to a wide range of emergency incidents (Kennedy, Rice, LaVancy, Zahralban, & Torres, et. al., 2016).

The problem is that since 2014, the Fire Service has not established the level of preparedness required when responding under conditions of civil unrest or violent incidents. The purpose of this Applied Research Project (ARP) is to analyze the effectiveness of the Fire Service preparedness and response to civil unrest. In the search for a clear definition of *civil unrest*, the researcher found a myriad of definitions in existence. For the purpose of this ARP, this definition of civil unrest was chosen: Any act of violence, riots, insurrections, unlawful obstructions, or assemblages that creates disorder that is detrimental to the public law and order. (Kennedy, Rice, LaVancy, Zahralban, & Torres, et. al., 2016).

To accomplish this study, the researcher will examine the history of civil unrest in the US, the effectiveness of applying the incident command system (ICS), and the unified command system (UC) with law enforcement and community relations programs and activities in the Fire Service. The ARP is structured to use a descriptive methodology in this examination, defined by John and Christensen (2014) as providing an accurate picture of the characteristics of a situation. This method is further supported by Creswell (2012) asserted the importance of the researcher analyzing participant responses to each question as well as understanding the overall trends of the data.

As the basis for the findings and recommendations, the following research questions were applied:

- 1) How effective is the Fire Service in developing and implementing positive relationships in the communities they serve?

- 2) What are some of the contributing factors in communities that lead to civil unrest incidents?
- 3) Does the Fire Service effectively operate with law enforcement agencies during civil unrest incidents?

The sources of information for this study were obtained from the literature review, recent fire department incidents, reports, peer-reviewed and executive fire officer studies, and electronic references pertaining to civil unrest incidents.

The topic of the ARP is important, timely and relevant to the Fire Service and has a direct nexus to three of the five United States Fire Administration's (USFA) strategic goals: 1) reduce risk at the local level through prevention and mitigation; 2) improve local planning and preparedness; and 3) improve the fire and emergency services capability for response to and recovery from all hazards (USFA, 2013).

The overall goal of this ARP is to analyze and make recommendations regarding the effectiveness of the fire service response to civil unrest incidents in their communities. As a result of this study, the researcher will recommend innovative ideas for Fire Service leaders to implement.

Background and Significance

Since 2014, many communities in the U.S. have experienced a significant increase in protest and civil unrest. According to a report by the United States Fire Administration and the Federal Emergency Management Act (2016). Incidents in Oakland, California as early as 2011; Ferguson, Missouri in 2014, and West Baltimore, Maryland in 2015, will be reviewed here. The Fire Service is at a critical point in history where an increase in national protests involving officer involved shootings, social injustice, politics, elections and socio-economic

issues are impacting public safety preparedness and response with law enforcement departments.

The Wingspread VI Conference is held every ten years to discuss issues, recommendations, and strategic action steps to address emerging issues in the Fire Service. Representatives from ten national fire service organizations are invited to participate. According to the Wingspread VI Conference Report (2016), fire and emergency service personnel must be prepared to respond to a multitude number of emergency incidents. However, preparation for violent incidents must be a part of continuous training. Although the Wingspread IV of 2016 offered fourteen well vetted recommendations, for the purpose of this ARP study, the researcher will focus on the following three recommendations:

1) The U.S. fire service and emergency services providers must be prepared for homeland security responses and local violence incidents. Critical components of preparation include:

- Strategy and tactics based on reliable intelligence,
- Unified Command guidelines for all affected public safety agencies,
- Standard Operating Guidelines with law enforcement and other public safety agencies for day-to-day operations,
- Personal protective equipment for first responders,
- Critical Incident Stress Management care for pre and post incidents,
- Pro-active strategies to improve relationships with members of the community,
- Continued support, training and funding from the Department of Homeland Security,
- Continued efforts to improve preparation response and recovery to violent incidents,
- Act as a partner in the intelligence community.

2) The U.S. fire service and emergency services must expect, embrace and adopt change by becoming change agents rather than being reactionary. Critical components of change include:

- Embrace all diversities, including race, gender, thought, experience and all other recognized definitions that reflect the human condition. The composition of the fire service should reflect the diversity of the community served,
- Support research initiatives,
- Use data and evidence-based research to support facts,
- Respond and adopt to changes in the community,
- Provide proactive services to the community through surveys and collaboration,
- Continue collaboration with private and public agencies,
- Strength and adopt new prevention initiatives beyond traditional messaging.

3) The U.S. fire and emergency services must prioritize an *all hazards mitigation and response* model that connects customers with resources. This can be accomplished by conducting community risk assessments to identify risk, needs, resources and services. Critical partnerships and collaboration must include:

- Building developers
- Public advocates
- Academia
- Customers
- Residents
- Clergy

- Researchers
- Futurists
- Software developer
- Other emergency service providers.

Literature Review

In August, the researcher completed the Executive Leadership course at the National Fire Academy and began the preliminary research for this ARP. Once receiving official approval to conduct the study, the research accessed the Learning Resource Center for Executive Fire Officer – ARP papers which proved to be very helpful for subsequent inquiries. Published reports on civil unrest, incident and unified command, community relations, leadership and change management were analyzed and cited. Sources of information were accessed from the LAFD Department Library and at the on-line research library at Grand Canyon University in Phoenix, Arizona. Additional sources of information includes; books, Fire Service reports and records, presidential legislation, peer-reviewed scholarly studies and newspaper articles. By analyzing this information, the researcher began to assess the effectiveness of the fire service response to civil unrest incidents.

The United States Experience in Civil Unrest

Historically, the U.S. has experienced many incidents of civil unrest in communities throughout the country. During the 1960's, urban violence increased in many cities. Minor to major civil disturbances, including extensive looting and rioting occurred in more than 150 cities (Kerner Commission, 1968). As a result of these incidents, 83 people were killed, 1,897 were injured and approximately 16,000 citizens were arrested of which 83% were black, 100 million dollars in property loss resulted (Briggs, 1968). On July 28, 1967, in response to this

national tragedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson established the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder, known as the Kerner Commission. Specifically, the Kerner Commission's 11-member was directed to examine the root causes and factors that contributed to an atmosphere of racial conflict, as well as to present potential solutions (Kerner Commission, 1968). The results of the study stated that economic disparity and racism were the underlying cause for civil unrest in this country and unless significant reforms were implemented, "America was moving toward two societies, one black, one white – separate and unequal" (Sullivan, Haberfeld, Rosen, Schultz, 2005).

During the long civil rights era struggle for social and economic justice, conflict between black and white ethnic groups became significant. According to the Kerner Commission (1968), deeply held grievances by the African American community evolved around police practices, unemployment, discrimination in housing, the justice system, and inadequate social services. The relationship between members of the African American and law enforcement had a long history of conflict, and according to the Kerner Commission (1968), was a direct contributing factor in riot behavior. The report further noted that almost all incidents of civil disorder stemmed from a preceding police action.

In analyzing attitudes throughout the country, the Kerner Report identified 12 deeply held grievances by community members listed in priority order: 1) police practices; 2) unemployment; 3) poor housing; 4) inadequate education; 5) poor recreational facilities; 6) ineffective political structure; 7) disrespectful white attitudes; 8) discriminatory justice systems; 9) poor federal programs; 10) poor municipal services; 11) discriminatory customer and credit practices; and, 12) inadequate social services (Kerner Commission, 1968).

Additional recommendations included:

- Develop Neighborhood Action Task Forces to improve communication between residents and government,
- Establish grievance response systems for all public agencies,
- Bring institutions and local government closer to the communities they serve,
- Expand opportunities for communities to participate in government.

Trust, respect and open communication are important attributes to have when building meaningful relationships. Increased communication across racial will help to decrease stereotypes, end hostility, create trust and a path forward toward social justice and public order (Kerner Commission, 1968). The findings of President Barack Obama's, 2014 Executive Order that established the Task Force on 21st Century Policing was formulated in response to the recent events of civil unrest. These events reflected a rift in the relationship between local law enforcement and the community residents they served (21st Century Policing, 2015). Of the six recommendations in the report, the one that is consistent with the findings of the Kerner Report recommended the importance of "building trust and legitimacy" with the community.

Los Angeles civil unrest: Following the verdict of the Rodney King beating, the acquittal of four Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers resulted in a devastating community reaction. Considered by many as the most catastrophic civil unrest in U.S. history, between April 29 and May 2, 1992, approximately \$ 1 billion dollars of property were lost (Spencer, 2004, Herman, 2004, USFA, 1992, & FEMA, 1992). The civil unrest in Los Angeles challenged firefighters, police officers and other agencies beyond any previous emergency incident (USFA & FEMA, 1992). The Los Angeles City Fire Department (LAFD) responded to 1,150 structure fires resulting in 10,000 businesses damaged, 58 deaths, and 2,300 injuries, including firefighters and police officers (Spencer, 2004, Herman, 2004, USFA,

1992, & FEMA, 1992). This incident required a coordinated UC response that led to the destruction of numerous properties and complicated violent reactions from residents. However, the initial response of some city officials showed confusion, uncertainty and lack of unified coordination. This was especially the case in the LAPD where the hesitation of police officers to respond to emergency calls was actually considered a factor in controlling the initial outbreak of violence (USFA & FEMA, 1992).

As coordination between LAFD and LAPD increased, the outcome was a successful unified command system to manage the incident. As law enforcement officers provided force protection, LAFD firefighters responded to 6,529 emergency incidents involving 863 massive structure fires spread out over a 105 square mile area within the initial 36 hours of the disturbance (Spencer, 2004). Reports indicated that the majority of the damage occurred in poor black, Latina and Asian communities (Spencer, 2004). The research also stated that the Los Angeles civil unrest was a predominantly multi-ethnic event where 36.2% of those arrested by LAPD officers were Black, 50.6% Latino, 10.7% White, and 2.5% Other (Pastor, 1995).

According to Spencer (2004), three factors contributed to an atmosphere of community despair: 1) abuse of minority residents by LAPD; (2) divestment by banks and other institutions in South Central Los Angeles; and (3) over three decades of anti-poor state and federal policies.

This unrest appeared again in 2011, in the City of Oakland, California when the 99% Occupy Oakland protests and civil unrest resulted in vandalism, theft and fires throughout the city. Urban unrest followed yet again in 2014, in the suburban community of Ferguson, Missouri when 18-year old Mr. Michael Brown was fatally shot by Officer Darren Brown from

the Ferguson Police Department (Chaney & Davis, 2015). This incident touched off many days of protest and vandalism from members of the community including many clashes with law enforcement. This next section focuses on that site of unrest.

Ferguson civil unrest: On August 9, 2014, Darren Wilson, a White police officer with the Ferguson Police Department shot and killed an unarmed 18-year old African American named Michael Brown (Chaney & Davis, 2015). This incident sparked outrage, protest and looting in the small suburban community. According to the Standard Operating Guidelines of the Ferguson Fire Department, when civil unrest escalates, fire department personnel will withdraw their equipment from fire stations and stage them with law enforcement officers in a safe location City of Ferguson Fire Department, 2014). (See Appendix A.) The purpose of these standard operating procedures is to provide a guide to fire departments when faced with incidents involving civil unrest, civil disturbance, riots, or other acts of violence. (See Appendix B.)

The Ferguson Fire Department is comprised of two fire stations staffed by 27 members. What initially began as two-days of community vigils, erupted in protests, vandalism and fires that challenged these 27 firefighters and law enforcement officers beyond their response capabilities. At the request of Governor Jay Nixon, the Missouri National Guard was activated and arrived in Ferguson to assist the public safety agencies (Chaney & Davis, 2015).

Following the Grand Jury decision not to indict Officer Wilson for the shooting death of Mr. Michael Brown, the Justice Department opened a civil rights investigation against the Ferguson Police Department. A major finding in the results of the investigation revealed a widespread pattern and practice of “routinely violating the constitutional rights of black residents” that “relied too heavily on use of force” during routine traffic stops (Chaney &

Davis, 2015). Another factor was demographic shift. The racial make-up of the City of Ferguson changed over the past two decades. In 1990, the population was 74% White and 25% Black (Rosenfeld, 2015). The current population is primarily comprised of 64% Black, 31% White and 1% Asian, and 23.7% of the population live below the poverty line (Artz, Little, Ridley & Scott, 2016).

Following the Ferguson civil unrest, city officials initiated a multi-agency tabletop exercise to examine the emergency operations center function, public information systems, incident command and communications. According to the City of Ferguson (2016), the results of the exercise produced an After Action Review Report listing the following recommendations:

- Develop a disaster recovery or continuity of operations plan,
- Assign agency liaisons to the incident command post and assign fire and police liaisons to staff the Emergency Operations Center,
- Create a comprehensive communication plan for the City of Ferguson,
- Improve communication with the joint information center and law enforcement command.

An After Action Report is a common practice in the Fire Service. According to the United States Agency for International Development (2006), the purpose of the After Action Review Technical Guide is designed to discuss events that focus on performance standards by identifying organizational strengths and weaknesses. This is basis for Fire Service learning from success and failure in preparation for future emergencies.

Baltimore civil unrest: The Ferguson, Missouri incident of civil unrest was followed in 2015, in Baltimore, Maryland with spontaneous and planned protests following the arrest and

death of 25-year old Mr. Freddie Gray at the hands of the Baltimore City Police Department. Numerous fires, injuries and arrest occurred as part of the initial response from residents whom residents in the West Baltimore area (USFA & FEMA, 2016).

The tension between the Baltimore City Police Department and residents had a long history of conflict (Estreet, Wells, Tirmazi, Sinclair, & Nesbitt, 2016). Black and Latino residents are significantly impacted by high rates of arrest, police brutality, poverty, crime, neighborhoods blighted by poor housing, and biased financial policies (Estreet et al., 2016; Wen, Warren, Tay, Khaldun, & O'Neitt, 2015). Many of these factors fueled the incident that occurred on April 19, 2015, when 25-year old Freddy Gray died at the hospital one-week later following his arrest by Baltimore City Police Officers. The death of Mr. Gray sparked days of protest in the streets that escalated to violence, looting and fires. On the first day in the civil unrest, the City of Baltimore allocated all emergency resources in response to the numerous requests for service. In addition, the Emergency Operation Center was activated. During the unrest the Baltimore Police Department coordinated with the Fire Department to provide force protection. Between April 25–27, 2015, firefighters responded to hundreds of emergency calls due to rioting, looting, and damage or destruction to over 300 structures (Mongeri, 2015). The National Guard was requested and dispatched to support first responders. On April 27, 2015, Baltimore City Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake formally declared a state of emergency and requested additional resources.

Following the civil unrest in the City of Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University commissioned a study entitled: Recommendations for Enhancing Baltimore City's Preparedness and Response to Mass Demonstration Events. The recommendations are as follows (Links, O'Connor & Saver, 2015).

- Implement community and crowd control efforts to de-escalate tensions and maintain peace,
- Protect the public and demonstrators,
- Protect the health, safety and moral of all personnel and responders,
- Develop clear incident command roles, chain of command, span of control and intelligence communications,
- Establish clear lines of communication with field personnel,
- Establish use of force and arrest procedures,
- Effective utilize intelligence information in the strategic planning process,
- Coordinate city-wide collaboration and deployment of mutual aid resources.

All of these recommendations are designed to identify potential gaps in the City of Baltimore's preparedness for mass demonstrations and to also serve as part of a road map to improve fire and police collaboration and response.

Fire Service Emergency Preparedness

Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies:
The Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIREScope) and the Incident Command System (ICS) evolved from a devastating wildland fire season in Southern California. In the fall of 1970, for a period of 13-days, dry, hot, winds scorched Southern California and damaged or destroyed watersheds and other resources (Chase, 1980). From September 22, 1970 to October 4, 1970, disastrous fires ravaged over 500,000 acres, destroyed over 700 homes and claimed the lives of 16 civilians (Chase, 1980). Challenging factors for firefighting resources were the lack of accurate information sharing,

poor organizational structure, competing for available resources and inconsistent operating procedures among the agencies assigned (Barbera & Stambler, 2011).

Resources assigned to the incident were from Los Angeles City Fire Department, Los Angeles County Fire Department, Department of Forestry and other surrounding Southern California Fire Departments. All were taxed beyond their ability to protect lives, property and the environment.

In 1972, government response to the conflagration came from the U.S. House of Representatives. A sub-committee was commissioned to assist Southern California fire agencies to review, research and develop applications of preparation and response to the annual wild land fire problem (FIRESCOPE, 1988). Congress appropriated \$900,000 dollars for the initial research and development that involved collaboration with the following government agencies:

- Los Angeles City Fire Department
- Los Angeles County Fire Department
- Santa Barbara County Fire Department
- Ventura County Fire Department
- California Department of Forestry
- California Office of Emergency Services
- California Region, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture

The cooperating agencies agreed on a basic operational concept called FIRESCOPE that focused on the timely commitment of resources including a common procedure and organizational structure for all emergency incidents. The outcome of the FIRESCOPE program produced three systems that established policy and operational principles related to Command

Systems Policy and Operations, Command System Development and System Implementation (Barbera & Stambler, 2011). These systems led to the development of a Multi-Agency Command and Control System and the Incident Command System.

Multi-Agency Command and Control System: The Multi-Agency Command and Control System concept (MACS) is designed to anticipate fire suppression needs for an incident. According to Chase (1980), MACS are designed to provide regional coordination for information, resources and situational assessment all involved Federal, State and local agencies for incidents occurring at the regional level. Chase (1980) stated the purpose of FIRESCOPE and the MACS and was to provide efficient and effective solutions to challenges experienced in major fire protection agencies, including operational coordination requirements in the Southern California urban wildland communities. MACS do not have independent organizational authority, however they do function as a support system for command, dispatch and enhancement of agency operations.

Incident Command System: The Incident Command System concept is designed to offer more effective ways to manage resources during an emergency incident. By 1974, the ICS organization structure was fully developed. The ICS is supported by a command staff that includes an operational section, planning section, logistics section and finance section commanders (Barbera & Stambler, 2011). (See Figure 1, below.) The effectiveness of applying ICS is based on the integration of system terminology and concepts into the daily operation of each agency (Chase, 1980). The ICS application can apply to single-agency or multi-agency incidents.

The ICS becomes functional at the moment resources are dispatched to an incident. ICS positions are associated with functions which are activated and de-activated by the incident

commander based on the needs of the incident. The role of incident commander is established when the first officer arrives on scene and provides a size-up, requests additional resources as needed, and deploys them based on the needs of the emergency. At this point, the ICS becomes operational in support of the incident commander to goal toward achieving objectives in priority order (USFA & FEMA, 1994). Chase (1980) asserted that it was not unusual in less complex incidents that one person can assume the role of several positions within the ICS structure.




Figure 1. Incident Command Structure

Unified Command: Prior to and during civil unrest incidents, the initial action of unified command is an important strategy for fire and law enforcement agencies to implement. According to Kennedy, Rice, LaVancy, Zahralban, and Torres (2016), the onset of a civil unrest is a law enforcement lead in a Unified Command (UC) structure. Fire service personnel

will require immediate force protection escorts from law enforcement to safely respond to reported fires, request for medical services, and other types of emergencies.

Unified Commanders are responsible for the overall management of assigned emergency resources. (Figure 2, below.) It is the place where all incident commanders from involved agencies come together to establish operational objectives and strategies in priority order in coordination of an effective response while maintaining their own jurisdictional responsibilities (Kennedy, Rice, LaVancy, Zahralban & Torres, 2016). The application of UC is critical to understand and continued pre-incident multi-agency training will clarify agency roles and responsibilities toward a successful outcome of the incident.



Figure 2. Unified Command

National Incident Management System: Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the world trade center in New York City, President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive # 5: Management of Domestic Incidents. This

directive created a single national emergency management system known as the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Considered the first-ever standardized approach to all-risk incident management and response, NIMS established a uniform set of procedures and processes that emergency responders at all levels of government can use to conduct response protocols and operations (Neamy, 2011). Released in March 2004, NIMS enabled all first responders to operate cooperatively and effectively to manage all domestic incidents. According to Homeland Security (2011), the NIMS concept integrated best practices into one comprehensive framework for use by emergency management and response personnel to all hazards nationwide.

Heavily influenced by the FIRESCOPE protocols, a federal mandate by Homeland Security Presidential Directive #5 required all federal departments and agencies to use the NIMS framework in domestic incident management in response to, and in support of incident and recovery activities (Neamy, 2001). State, tribal and local governments are not required to participate in NIMS or adopt these best practices. However, to be considered NIMS compliant, local jurisdictions must operate under the ICS and NIMS principles to be considered eligible for the receipt of federal preparedness funds, grants contracts and other resources (Homeland Security, 2011).

FIRESCOPE, MAC, ICS, UC and NIMS are all effective preparation and response systems that evolved to provide operational coordination with all responding agencies that are responsible for mitigating emergency incidents. Specifically, for fire and law enforcement, these systems provide functional guidelines for addressing conditions that occur during a civil unrest. However, without local cooperation and compliance, effectiveness will be limited.

Community Relations and Public Education in the Fire Service

The National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control was established in 1971 by President Richard Nixon in response to the significant number of fires due to civil unrest and disorder that plagued urban communities throughout the country. The underlying cause of many of those civil unrest incidents were directly related to increased urbanization, social inequities, poor housing, expansion of ghettos and immigration (America Burning, 1973). At that time, the commission was directed to study the fire problem in the U.S. and forward recommendations to reduce the number of fires in cities, suburbs and communities. The 1973 report entitled: *America Burning*, recommended that emphasis should be placed on the prevention of fires by implementing local public education programs and investing in built-in fire safety systems in structures. Furthermore, the commission also recommended the establishment of the United States Fire Administration to provide guidance that focused on the fire problem and the National Fire Academy to influence fire service leaders to shift priorities toward fire prevention education in collaboration with the communities they served (America Burning, 1973).

By strengthening relations in communities, Fire Service leaders will increase the likelihood of meeting the public's expectations. Fire safety and prevention is one of several strategies that can be used to meet this expectation. Customer service, loss prevention, diversity, firefighter health and safety were some of the recommendations from *America at Risk, a Re-commissioned Study of America Burning* (Blue Ribbon Panel, 1998).

The Fire Service commitment to developing and implementing public education programs increased over the years. The FEMA publication entitled, *Public Education Today: Fire Service Programs from Across America*, provided evidence of 80 public fire safety

education programs from fire departments throughout the country (FEMA, 1990). However, the report also stated that appropriate funding, training of recruit firefighters in public education and staffing remained barriers for most fire departments (FEMA, 1990).

Further public education and advocacy sponsored by FEMA was the publication of *Leadership in Public Fire Safety Education Forum* (June, 1993) followed by the report entitled, *The North American Coalition for Fire and Life Safety Education Symposium* (April, 2001). Although many recommendations were contained in each of these reports, the one consistent recommendation stated the importance of the fire service building community relationships to improve fire safety education (FEMA, 1993; 2001).

Measuring effectiveness: Measuring the effectiveness of fire prevention initiatives is an important strategy. A review of the U.S. fire prevention programs from 1998-2004 published interesting results. According to Ta, Frattaroli, Bergen and Gielen (2006), community based canvassing and smoke alarm installation campaigns were the most effective strategies to distribute smoke alarms and to maintain their operational status. The success of these programs required the cooperation and support of local fire stations within the targeted area. Additional qualitative reports explored the most effective ways to reach communities with fire safety information, and showed that the residents in the City of El Paso, Texas were more concerned with providing financial and emotional support for family members as opposed to the risk of a fire in their home (DLG Research, 2012). While in the City of Memphis, Tennessee, Williams (2012) found four key strategies that included:

- Raise the awareness of fire risk by educating the public,
- Provide financial assistance to those in need,
- Demolish all vacant properties,

- Enforce all building codes in rental properties.

Program implementation processes: The National Fire Protection Association's Urban Fire and Life Safety Task Force is comprised of representatives of large urban fire departments who are committed to increasing their efforts to deliver fire and injury prevention programs to at-risk populations. To accomplish their goals, the task force adopted the USFA's *5-step planning* process (see Figure 3, below,) and the *5-E's* model (see Figure 4, below,) for implementing targeted programs (Gamache, Comoletti, Hall, Ahrens, & Mieszala, 2011). What is now known as Community Risk Reduction, this all-hazards, risk reduction philosophy has embraced the *5-step planning process* as the best practice for successful risk-reduction initiatives (Sawyer, Phillips, Catts, & Sawyer, 2016).




Figure 3. Community Risk Reduction Development Plan, five step model for community relationship building.

The 5 E's




Figure 4. The five E's of Community Risk Reduction for the development of community relationship building.

Acquiring social capital is based on establishing relationships through community based initiatives that involve residents, firefighters, law enforcement, government, private sector and non-profit organizations (Kennedy, Rice, LaVancy, Zahralban & Torres, 2016). According to Bamattre (1997), retired Fire Chief from LAFD, it is critically important for firefighters to cultivate a true community-based service delivery system. Based on the ever-changing social environment, these grassroots approaches are designed to improve to overall quality of life for the all residents that reside in communities throughout the country. When volatile situations have occurred in local neighborhoods, it was the pre-established trust and

respect between public safety agencies and community residents that contributed to an overall positive outcome.

Implications for Fire Service and Law Enforcement

Law enforcement in the U.S. is at a critical crossroad in policing. The last 2-years have been the most challenging for police officers in recent history (Police Executive Research Forum, 2015).

Police officers shown using deadly force on viral social media posts have placed tremendous stress on their relationships with members of the community. Cities like Cleveland, Baltimore, Ferguson, Oakland, New York, and Chicago, where violent crimes remain high, also have a long history of corruption, bigotry, discrimination and institutional abuse (Blako, 2016). Although civil unrest incidents are directly related to actions by police officers, they are, in many cases, also impacting the local firefighters who respond with law enforcement to provide medical care and other services.

Therefore, as government agencies begin to address the problem of police reform and accountability to the public, it is imperative that the Fire Service also becomes a part of that change process. According to the U.S. Department of Justice Community Policing Consortium, community is a philosophy that advocates collaboration between law enforcement and the community to develop pro-active strategies to solve problems that fuels public safety issues such as social disorder, crime and the fear of crime (Department of Justice, 1994; Police Executive Research Forum, 2014).

A community-based approach to problem solving is an important first step to restoring public trust in both law enforcement and fire service agencies. The manner in which law enforcement departments respond to mandates on reform and community policing also has

direct implications for the effectiveness of the Fire Service delivery systems. Finally, partnering and training with law enforcement must continue as a priority for the Fire Service. This is especially important when and where the possibility of civil unrest exists.

Leadership and Change Management

During uncertain and turbulent times, an important strategy for leaders is to accept the challenge as an initial path forward for change to occur. Change management practices can be different from one organization to another (Hughes, 2007) and will require the leader to understand the complexities, sources and impact of conflict for change to occur (Cooper, 2014). According to Kouzes and Posner (2012), it is the responsibility of leaders to inspire people during conflict to embrace a future that is uplifting and inspiring. Dr. John Kotter of Harvard Business School offered an effective and basic change model designed to support successful change initiatives. According to Dr. Kotter (1996) eight steps must be accomplished: (1) creating a sense of urgency; (2) developing coalitions; (3) establishing a shared vision for change; (4) communicating that vision; (5) removing obstacles; (6) creating and celebrating short-term wins; (7) building on the change; and (8) anchoring the change in the organizational culture. Empowering others and celebrating successes are all inter-related and important for change to be realized. (See Figure 5, below.)




Figure 5. Dr. Kotter's Leading Change Model

Effective change initiatives are also dependent on the type of leadership style the leader applies. For instance, the leadership style that is most effective that supports command and control organizations is an autocratic style of leadership. This is when the leader is empowered by hierarchy to direct subordinates to accomplish certain tasks in a timely manner.

Authoritative leadership is enacted during emergency incidents like civil unrest where ICS and UC are implemented. However, during non-emergency situations where public safety agencies are engaged in community collaborations and partnerships, an autocratic style of leadership is not appropriate for problem-solving and change management. According to Cooper (2014), change creates the opportunity to influence the behavior of others and in the case of leadership styles, the attributes and practices of transformational leadership is most appropriate in a change environment. Qualities of a transformational leader include consideration for others, shared vision, motivation and intellectual nurturing (McKnight, 2013). These are important

qualities required for the community interface. However, for change to become grounded, an authentic relationship must be established. Flaherty (2010) stated for relationships to be most effective, they must be grounded in trust, respect and honest communication. As in the case of the Fire Service and law enforcement, a community-based approach to service delivery emphasized that the elements of relationships are important to develop and maintain. This becomes critically important in a change environment.

Summary

The general mission of the Fire Service is to protect the lives and property in the communities they serve. This is accomplished by the over one million sworn and volunteer firefighters who risk their lives each day in the service of others. Research shows over the past two years the service delivery systems of local fire departments has been impacted by socio-economics, crime, politics, officer involved shootings and civil unrest incidents.

The success of serving the community is inter-dependent on public safety agencies, especially fire and law police departments, their training, the coordination of critical ICS, UC and community relations responsibilities. These actions must become and remain a priority in the preparation of potential civil unrest and for the safety of all first responders in their efforts to consistently deliver a high level of quality service to the communities they serve. As social conditions continue to shift, the importance of establishing and nurturing meaningful relationships between firefighters, law enforcement and community residents will result in decreasing violence toward public safety first responders.

Procedures

The initial part of the research began in 2016 at the National Fire Academy. The Learning Resource Center (LRC) is an excellent source for content information in the Literature Review. Executive Fire Officer (EFO) papers were researched at the LRC by using the online catalog search engine. Between January and March 2017, an internet search was conducted through Google and Google Scholar search engines. Other sources of information was obtained from the Grand Canyon University Library, peer-reviewed articles, books, FEMA, USFA and NFPA websites, published reports and data collection from the on-line survey.

On-Line Survey

In order to assess Fire Service members on the issues surrounding civil unrest, an electric web-based survey was created. Electronic surveys are web-based systems that can be used to collect data on a computer (Creswell, 2012). The survey was administered through SurveyMonkey^(R) (<http://www.surveymonkey.com>), an on-line survey collection tool. The population sample was based on selecting individuals who are in the Fire Service and has specific knowledge of fire service operations and programs. Current and past EFO graduates were also part of the sample population. The survey was distributed to these individuals in the through TRADENET, a sharing and training information exchange web system sponsored by the U.S. Fire Administration (<https://www.usfa.fema.gov/training/nfa/programs/trade.html>.) A total of 58 confidential surveys were completed out of a total of 38,611 that were distributed (Appendix C). The purpose of the on-line survey was to establish original research data on the issues. The issues were framed by the literature review and the goals of the research. This resulted in the following questions in the survey:

- 1) How long have you been a member of the Fire Service?
- 2) What is your current rank?
- 3) Is your department career, volunteer, or a combination of both?
- 4) How many members of your department are uniform members?
- 5) How many members of your department are civilian?
- 6) How would you rate the effectiveness of your Fire Department's overall community relations programs/activities?
- 7) Does your Fire Department have community programs that are based out of the local fire station?
- 8) My Fire Department values diversity and inclusion when serving community residents?
- 9) During emergency operations, my Fire Department implements the incident command system?
- 10) During emergency operations, my Fire Department operates in unified command with other law enforcement agencies?
- 11) In your experience/opinion, what are some of the socio-economic factors that can contribute to violent incidents developing in your community?
- 12) In your opinion, what changes would you recommend to improve your Fire Department's community relations programs?
- 13) In your opinion, what recommendations would you make to improve your Fire Department's unified strategy and tactics when operating with law enforcement agencies at emergency incidents?

Questions 1 through 5 were designed to capture demographic information, while questions 6-8 focused on community programs, and questions 9, 10, and 13 focused on emergency operations. Questions 11 and 12 asked participants to provide opinions on the community and Fire Service relations.

In particular, Question 6 was designed to assess to what extent fire departments are engaged in effective community relations activities. Question 7 came from analyzing the content of the literature review. Many of the studies cited provided recommendations that emphasized the importance of community relations as an essential strategy to strengthen relationships with residents and as a vehicle to deliver fire safety and injury prevention programs. Question 8 asked about diversity and inclusion because these are important strategies to understand and adopt. The literature review stated the ethnic make-up of the U.S. has shifted to a more diverse population. Understanding cultural values and practices that make-up communities can strengthen the Fire Service in the delivery of service as well as improved relationships with residents. Question 10 also came out of the literature review. Studies provided valuable information on the importance of operating in UC with fire and law enforcement departments. This question was designed to measure, to what extent, effective UC occurs when responding police and fire agencies are operating at civil unrest incidents.

Assumptions and Limitations

During the development of the research paper certain limitations became evident. For instance, while the research was directed at fire service and emergency medical personnel, given the nature of the study on civil unrest incidents, valuable information from law enforcement departments was overlooked. However, exposure to junk mail and the

assumption that email addresses were accurate may have impacted the low percentage of responses.

Another limitation was the assumption that participants would answer all of the questions honestly regarding their experience, personal feelings and attitudes. An additional limitation was the number of participants invited versus a more purposeful sample that would have invited Fire Chiefs of departments that have directly experienced civil unrest incidents. Data from a purposefully-selected sample population would have provided a more accurate account of fire department operations. Finally, the researcher sent out a total of 38,611 random surveys throughout the Fire Service and received only 58 responses. Although the content returned by the participants was well documented with rich content, an overall .2% return of surveys has created a major limitation in this ARP paper.

The researcher relied on information from the literature review, on-line survey, peer-reviewed studies and archived reports as the basis to reach objective conclusions and to establish the foundation to offer recommendations to improve the Fire Service response to civil unrest.

Results

The final results of the on-line survey are presented in a format that outlines each research question for ease of reference and consistency. The overall number of respondents was $N=58$.

Research Question #1: How long have you been a member of the Fire Service? Of the total respondents, 46% (27 participants) had 26+ years of service; 32% (19 participants) of respondents reported 21-25 years of service, 15% (9 participants) of respondents reported 16-

20 years of service, 3% (2 participants) reported 10-15 years of service and 2% (1 participant) reported 6-10 years of service.

Research Question #2: What is your current rank? The response to this question is as follows: 30% are Fire Chiefs, 14% Deputy Chiefs, 16% Assistant Chiefs, 9% District/Battalion Chiefs, 14% Fire Captains and 2% are Firefighters/Emergency Medical Technicians.

Research Question #3: Is your department career, volunteer, or a combination of both? The data shows that 72% of respondents are from career departments, 24% combination and 3% are from volunteer departments.

Research Question #4: How many members of your department are uniform members? Of the responses received, 72% stated that 1-200 members are uniformed, 10% stated 201-500, 5% stated 501-1000 and 12% answered that they have over 1000 uniform members in their department.

Research Question #5: How many members of your department are civilian? Respondents overall stated that 1-20 members are civilian which represents 66% of responses, 12% stated 21-50 civilians, 5% have 51-100 civilians and 9% of the respondents have over 100 civilian employees.

Research Question #6: How would you rate the effectiveness of your Fire Department's overall community relations programs/activities? Of the 57 respondents, 10% stated --not effective, 35% --somewhat effective, 28%-- answered effective and 24% responded -- very effective, one respondent stated their community relations activities are poor.

Research Question #7: Does your Fire Department have community programs that are based out of the local fire station? Of the 57 participants that responded, 70% answered "yes" while 30% answered "no."

Research Question #8: My Fire Department values diversity and inclusion when serving community residents? A total of 58 respondents answered the question. Of this response rate, 86% answered "yes." while 10% stated "no." Three percent of respondents stated "they have never addressed diversity" and "we are working on it".

Research Question #9: During emergency operations, my Fire Department implements the incident command system? 56% of respondents answered -- very effective, while 33% answered -- effective, 7% stated -- somewhat effective, and 1% responded -- not effective.

Research Question #10: During emergency operations, my Fire Department operates in unified command with other law enforcement agencies? Of the 57 responses received, 8% stated not effective, 21% stated somewhat effective and 26% stated very effective, while 5% of the respondents stated the following: "police don't like operating in ICS", "when needed" and "law enforcement doesn't grasp the concept".

Research Question #11: In your experience/opinion, what are some of the socio-economic factors that can contribute to violent incidents developing in your community? This question was designed for respondents to provide a narrative to describe their experiences and opinions. A total of 53 participants responded to the survey question. Although there were many different perspectives, the top 6 responses that were continually stated include:

- Lack of jobs
- Low income communities
- Racial tensions
- Poor education system
- Politics
- Gangs and drugs

Research Question #12: In your opinion, what changes would you recommend to improve your Fire Department's community relations programs? The responses to this question will be summarized and included in the recommendations chapter of the study.

Research Question #13: In your opinion, what recommendations would you make to improve your Fire Department's unified strategy and tactics when operating with law enforcement agencies at emergency incidents? The responses to this question will be summarized and included in the recommendations chapter of the study.

Discussion

As the literature review revealed, the Fire Service has a long history of being involved in community based activities and many of the studies recommend the benefits of such interactions went a long way to building social capital between the fire station and residents (Kennedy, Rice, LaVancy, Zahralban & Torres, 2016).

Effective community involvement programs are critical to preventing, mitigating and managing civil unrest emergencies (Kennedy, Rice, LaVancy, Zahralban & Torres, 2016). For community relations to work, firefighters at the local fire stations must make a concerted effort to engage residents through dialogue and non-emergency services. This can include opening the fire station doors and inviting the public in for coffee and a tour of station. Additional involvement can also include attending community meetings, events and social activities. These types of action can ease stress, create the opportunity for firefighters to create new friendships, and bridge the gap during civil unrest.

An effective emergency response system must begin with understanding the purpose and the appropriate application. According to Lockhart (1992), during civil unrest incidents fire department resources are often stretched beyond their limits. Therefore, it is not unusual

for the dispatch of initial resources to be modified to handle the heavy call volume. Fire departments who serve communities that may be at risk for civil unrest must prepare and train their personnel (Groves, 1999). Part of the preparation must include UC training with firefighters and police officers. Groves (1999) stated that inter-agency training was essential to the safety of personnel operating in a violent environment. Bruno (1992) asserts the importance of planning riot operations, with the emphasis on coordination and communication between the police and firefighters. In response to the survey question regarding the effectiveness of law and fire unified command operations during civil unrest, a combined 29% of respondents stated UC operations were somewhat effective, or not effective at all. This response was alarming and underscored the way fire service leaders must continue to advocate for and practice unified command operations.

The overall content of the literature review remained consistent with many of the findings from the on-line survey. Preparation and practice for civil unrest incidents was important to the fire service and must include ICS and UC training on an on-going basis.

Also, understanding the contributing factors to civil unrest can provide public safety agencies with the opportunity to assess their local fire station environment and reinvest in deepening relationships with residents through communication and interaction.

And finally, investing in pro-active public education programs that target high risk populations in low income areas will minimize the likelihood of fires and injuries occurring. This will also cut down on request for service. The implications of these actions will increase the social capital of the fire service and build trust among firefighters and individual members in the community.

Recommendations

The extensive search found in the literature review and on-line survey responses provided the results that led to recommendations to improve the fire service preparation and response to civil unrest. This information remains at the forefront of all deployments and operational decisions when civil unrest occurs (Groves, 1999).

The first recommendation is for the fire service to invest resources to complete a vulnerability assessment of operational performance. According to the Urban Fire Forum report entitled: Fire Service Deployment: Assessing Community Vulnerability, “effectively managing a fire department requires an understanding of an ability to demonstrate how changes to resources will affect community outcomes (Urban Fire Forum, 2012).

The second recommendation is to develop policies and procedures that adopt the principles of ICS, UC and NIMS as the foundation for managing emergencies and interaction with local, state and federal agencies.

The third recommendation is for the fire service to invest in emergency preparedness exercises that include inter-agency cooperation in planning and preparation for civil unrest (Groves, 1999). The focus of the training includes table-top exercises to learn and apply the principles associated with ICS, UC and NIMS.

The fourth recommendation involves developing and implementing an inter-agency operability communication platform that allows all responding fire and police resources to communicate by radio during emergencies (Grove, 1999).

The fifth and final recommendation is to ensure that the fire service continues to value establishing honest relationships with the residents in the community they serve. This cooperative relationship must include; law enforcement, elected officials, profit and

non-profit organizations, clergy and gang intervention organizations.

Based on the researcher's analysis of this study, it is evident that the leadership culture and philosophy of command and control systems has its value, However, fire service leaders must shift the culture of first responders to a more pro-active understanding of demographic shifts within society that impact the ability to deliver much needed quality service. The findings of this study suggests that the implications of societal changes that influence behavior in communities are directly related to socio-economics, politics and the ethnic make-up of the community. To remain relevant, the Fire Service must take into account the impact of these changes on the population of firefighters and their ability to maintain relationships within their communities.

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Appendix A

Civil Unrest Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)



CIVIL UNREST SAMPLE SOP

FIRE DEPARTMENT (NAME)
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE
(MONTH/ YEAR)

SUBJECT: CIVIL UNREST

To provide a guide for Fire Department activities during civil unrest including riots, civil disturbances or related hostile and violent encounters that will result in a prompt and coordinated action while providing proper liaison between fire and law enforcement (LE) in accordance with (City/County) Emergency Operations Plan.

DEMONSTRATION/ PROTEST

A demonstration or protest is a legal public assembly of persons exhibiting sympathy with, or opposition to, a political, legal, economic, or social condition or movement. A demonstration/protest may become illegal and dangerous when it includes active resistance and civil disobedience as a deliberate violation of a law.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE

A civil disturbance is any breach of the peace by a significant number of people assembled in one area or the gathering of an unruly mob. This may include any situation which, in the opinion of the onsite law enforcement commander, could develop into a riot.

CIVIL UNREST/ RIOT

A riot is civil unrest/disorder wherein crowds display a propensity for violence by setting fires, vandalizing, looting, attacking civilians, firefighters or law enforcement,

or engaging in other violent acts. Frequently, such actions will not stop without the intervention of law enforcement personnel.

HOT ZONE

A Hot Zone (or exclusion zone) is the area of civil unrest or riot as designated by the on-scene law enforcement commander, in which civilian vehicle access is denied and fire department vehicles will not enter unless accompanied by law enforcement escorts. When possible, the hot zone will be designated by perimeter streets.

- Hot Zone - Unstable, potentially unsafe given observed protest/riot conditions & actions.
- Warm Zone - An area, in the current state, that is relatively safe for emergency responder operations, with observable indicators that suggest that instability could possibly ensue.
- Cold Zone - Safe Area with little likelihood of unrest

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER

The emergency operations center is located in the (LOCATION) and is the point where representatives of all the public safety departments and other designated (CITY/COUNTY) department representatives meet to coordinate responses/actions related to jurisdiction-wide emergencies.

TASK FORCE

A task force is a unified group of apparatus and personnel assembled in response to a civil unrest/riot condition. A Task Force will consist of 3 Engines, 1 Ladder, 1 Battalion Chief w/aide and 1 ALS unit, and two law enforcement vehicles each with a minimum of four officers. A task force responds as a single unit, operates as a unified team, and shall not be separated when deployed during a civil unrest event.

It will be the responsibility of each member to exercise the appropriate control dictated by his/her rank in the implementation of this SOP. Personnel should anticipate the need for implementing the guidelines of this procedure and should be prepared to activate them prior to actual need. Incidents of civil unrest is considered essentially a law enforcement event and the fire department shall coordinate with the law enforcement incident commander throughout the incident via unified command.

DEMONSTRATIONS

Notifications

Field Units - Commanding Officers/Acting Officers confronted with a demonstration in their first due area will immediately notify the Fire Communications Center (FCC) so that other units may avoid the area of the demonstration. Notification should include the exact location, crowd size, and general conditions observed.

Fire Communications Center Supervisor- When notified by field units of demonstration conditions will contact the law enforcement Radio Supervisor in order to confirm the incident and apprise him/her of the demonstration. If confirmed or notified first by the law enforcement Radio Supervisor, the FCC Supervisor will notify:

- The Assistant/Deputy Chief
- The Battalion Chief in the affected area
- First due companies in the affected area

Responsibility

Companies responding to assignments in the area of a demonstration are to avoid the affected area as much as possible.

Companies responding to assignments at the location of a demonstration are to:

- Request that law enforcement be notified and respond
- Shut off lights and sirens at least 3 blocks from the scene.
- Use all normal precautions
- Meet with the LE Supervisor on the scene
- Assess the need for additional assistance
- Leave promptly after service is rendered

CIVIL DISTURBANCES

Notifications

Field Units - Commanding Officers/Acting Officers when confronted with a civil disturbance, that they believe could escalate into a civil unrest/riot situation, will immediately notify the FCC Supervisor. Notification should include the exact location, crowd size, and general conditions observed.

Supervisor, FCC - When notified by field units of the civil disturbance, will contact the law enforcement Radio Supervisor in order to confirm the incident and apprise of the

civil disturbance situation. If confirmed, or notified first by the law enforcement Supervisor, the FCC Supervisor will notify the following of the situation.

- The Assistant/Deputy Chief and all on-duty Chief Officers, beginning with those in the affected area.
- All companies via an announcement on the P.A. system, Fire Radio and electronic message on the CAD terminal; “All companies use extreme caution in the area of (ADDRESS) due to civil disturbance.”
- The Assistant/Deputy Fire Chief/Commissioner.
- The law enforcement Radio Supervisor of all alarms received from the disturbance area to ascertain the need for fire equipment and if needed to request information on the best response route.

Responsibility

Assistant/Deputy Chiefs – Upon receipt of confirmation of a civil disturbance from the FCC, the Assistant/Operations Chiefs will:

- Continuously monitor the situation by obtaining updated reports on conditions from the FCC
- Assign the first due Battalion Chief to proceed to the law enforcement Command Post, meet with the law enforcement Commander and conduct an on scene assessment of conditions. If the Battalion Chief’s assessment warrants, the Assistant/Deputy Chief will proceed to the LE Command Post and assume the role of Fire Department Incident Commander via Unified Command with Law Enforcement.

Battalion Chiefs – Upon receipt of confirmation of a civil disturbance from the FCC, the Battalion Chief will:

- Be responsible to see that all orders relative to this procedure are carried out in their respective Battalions.
- Ensure that companies on radio and not engaged in emergency activities return to their respective stations.
- Notify the officers of all companies under their command of the location of the disturbance area, as well as nature and conditions. Periodic updates should be provided as they become available.
- If assigned by the Assistant/Deputy Chief, respond to the Law Enforcement (LE) Command Post and conduct an on-scene assessment of conditions including the following.
 - Ascertain the location of the LE Command Post from the FCC and proceed, out of service, to that location.
 - Meet with the on-scene LE Commander and determine the following.
 - The LE Department’s evaluation of the situation including the current level of response by LE.
 - The boundaries of the disturbance area.
 - The assistance required from the FD including the need to assign a Medic unit to the Command Post.

- The effect on response patterns for suppression companies and medic units in the affected area.
- After assessing the nature and conditions of the civil disturbance, inform the Assistant/Deputy Chief of his/her findings and recommendations and the effect of the disturbance on the FD's service delivery. This information should also be given to the FCC. The use of cellular phones, if available, is recommended.

Company Officers - Upon notification of a civil disturbance by any official departmental authority will ensure compliance with the following directives.

- If in the area of the disturbance, fire station doors will be closed and members will remain inside. The station should be secured to prevent unauthorized entry.
- When riding the apparatus or in service on an assignment within the affected area, all personnel will wear all protective clothing with turnout coats fully closed. Apparatus drivers and EMS personnel only are exempt from wearing gloves and boots.
- All members are to ride in the cab or crew cab with windows closed.
- Keep the FCC informed of any witnessed changes in conditions related to disturbance.
- WARNING LIGHTS, SIRENS AND AIR HORNS WILL NOT BE USED IN THE AFFECTED AREA.
- Tools are to be kept in locked compartments or inside the cab when not in use.
- Position apparatus at intersections whenever possible to affect a rapid exit, if necessary.
- Use caution and common sense to avoid increasing tensions. Avoid hostile verbal exchanges, gestures, or physical contact. Complete the assignment, if possible, and leave the scene.
- The use of water lines or tools for crowd control is STRICTLY FORBIDDEN. Crowd control is a LE function.
- If in the officer's opinion, conditions present an unreasonable risk to the safety of members or to safe operations, leave the area immediately by the most expedient route and notify the FCC of the same.

Emergency Medical Supervisors

- Whenever a civil disturbance area is identified, the Emergency Medical Supervisor on duty in the affected Division will be notified by the FCC
- The Emergency Medical Supervisor in the affected Division will respond to the LE Command Post and meet with the assigned Battalion Chief to determine the nature and conditions of the disturbance and the effect on response patterns for medic units.
- S/he will then ensure that all Medic Units in the area of the disturbance are aware of the conditions and the boundaries of the affected area.

- The Emergency Medical Supervisor in the Division (or neighboring Division) not affected by the civil disturbance will proceed to the FCC to assist in any EMS related activities.

Considerations

The severity of a civil disturbance, as well as the area affected may vary greatly. Personnel must be flexible in their response to the conditions presented by such events. Considerations include:

- Have LE investigate and verify the need for Fire and EMS responses in the affected area BEFORE the commitment of FD units.
- Assignment of LE escorts and stay with all FD units for all Fire and EMS responses in the affected area.
- Relocation of personnel and apparatus from a station in the immediate area of the civil disturbance to another station if necessary.
- The use of a Task Force response in the affected area instead of regular deployment models.
- Assembling a Task Force at the LE Command Post or other staging area for use in the affected area. A Task Force consists of 3 Engines, 1 Ladder, 1 Battalion Chief w/aide and an ALS unit with 2 LE escorts. The Task Force responds as a single unit, operates as a unified team and is not separated.
- Continual updates from the FCC to all stations on conditions and boundaries of the affected areas.

CIVIL UNREST/ RIOTS

Notifications

Supervisor, FCC - when notified by the LE Radio Supervisor or a Fire Department Chief Officer located at the LE Command Post that a riot condition exists, will ascertain the boundaries of the affected area including any hot zones and will notify the following.

- All companies via an announcement on the P.A. system, Fire Radio and printout message on the CAD terminal: *"A riot condition now exists in the area bounded by (STREET NAMES when possible)...companies are to use extreme caution when responding."* Boundaries of any hot zone should be included in this message. Units involved in emergency responses will be advised via radio that a riot condition exists and the boundaries of any hot zone. All units "on radio" and not committed to an emergency will be ordered to return to their stations.
- The Fire Chief (Commissioner)
- The Assistant / Deputy Chiefs (Commissioners)
- All on-duty Chief Officers
- The on-duty and Command Fire Marshal
- On-duty EMS Command Officer and EMS Supervisors

- The Administrative Services Director
- All "ON CALL" Staff officers and Departmental civilian unit heads, as specified by the Fire Chief (Commissioner)
- The on-duty supervisor at Fleet Management

Responsibility

"On Call" Assistant / Deputy Chiefs (Deputy Commissioners)- when notified that a riot condition exists will take the following actions:

- Proceed to the LE Command Post to establish unified command and assume the role of Fire Incident Commander.
- Meet with the LE Incident Commander (normally a LE Deputy or Assistant Chief/Commissioner) to assess conditions. After gathering information from the LE Incident Commander, conferring with the on-scene Division Chief and with FCC Command, determine the number of Task Forces to be assembled and their staging area.
- Assistant/Deputy Chiefs will restore the Division as appropriate to assure coverage for the City.

Division Chiefs - when notified that a riot condition exists will take the following action.

- If the affected area is within his/her jurisdiction, will go out of service and proceed to the LE Command Post, meet with the LE Operations Section Chief and conduct an assessment of conditions.
- The Division Chief will be the Fire Department Operations Chief and will coordinate responses, assignment of Task Forces and other activities with the LE Operations Section Chief (normally a Chief Inspector).
- If not in the affected area, the Division Chief will report to the Fire Communications Center and assume FCC Command until relieved by the Chief of Communications or a Staff Assistant or Deputy Chief. During regular business hours, Chief of Communications or a Staff Assistant or Deputy Chief will be assigned this function.

FCC Command - The Assistant/Deputy Chief responding to the Fire Communications Center will conduct the following actions.

- Dispatch Field Communications to the location of the LE Command Post to facilitate communications.
- Upon the activation of the Emergency Operations Center (LOCATION) assign a Battalion Chief or Captain to act as the Department's representative.
- Establish direct communications with the LE Department by sending a Fire Captain to the LE Radio Room (LOCATION). The Captain should be equipped with a portable fire radio to monitor conditions.

- Consult with the “On-Call” Assistant/Deputy Chief (Commissioner) and provide input on the number of Task Forces that should be assembled.
- At the direction of the Fire Chief (Commissioner), or his/her designee, implement recall procedures in accordance with (SOP #) to ensure:
 - The FCC is properly staffed and that sufficient personnel are utilized to handle the increased radio traffic and number of incidents. If required, uniformed personnel, trained in FCC procedures may be used to augment the FCC staff.
 - Enough Division Chiefs are recalled to staff each Division. All other off-duty Assistant/Deputy Chiefs should be notified to standby for possible assignment.
 - Battalion Chiefs on platoon days off are alerted to standby for possible assignment.
 - Sufficient personnel are recalled to maintain appropriate staffing level on Engines and Ladders.
 - Sufficient staffing is provided to companies housing special equipment and apparatus to prevent delays in response.
- Monitor the location of all reserve apparatus and equipment and conduct periodic updates as needed.
- If a hot zone is established and fire stations must be abandoned, ensure that reserve apparatus are also relocated to stations outside of the affected area.
- If Mutual Aid assistance from outside departments is requested, ensure that these units are stationed in outlying areas. Mutual Aid companies will require a FD member, equipped with a portable fire radio, to act as a guide. Only FD units will operate in a hot zone.
- Work with the Director of Office of Emergency Management and/or the Administrative Services Director or his/her designate to arrange for food and beverages at Staging areas and Task Force Assembly sites.

Fire Operations Chief - The Division Chief that responds to the LE Command Post will be the Fire Operations Chief and will:

- Determine the nature and conditions of the riot including the area affected and if any hot zones have been established.
- Maintain communications with the FCC via radio or cellular phone to keep them advised of conditions and boundaries of the affected area.
- Consult with the “On-Call” Assistant/Deputy Chief (Commissioner) and provide input to determine the number of Task Forces that should be assembled.
- Determine appropriate staging areas for Task Forces.
- Inform the LE Operations Chief of the location of staging areas for Task Forces so that designated LE escorts may be sent to link up with the Task Force.
- Request through the LE Operations Chief that LE investigate all fire and EMS calls to determine the actual need for equipment. Keep FCC apprised of actions to be taken.
- Coordinate assignment of Task Forces and assure that adequate LE protection is in place before committing Task Forces to incidents in the affected area.

- Consult with EMS Command to determine the status of response to medical calls in the affected area. This situation may include temporarily suspending routine EMS service in the hot zone, and first responder service throughout the City (County).
- Consider assigning at least one (1) officer to the Unified Command Post to act as a recorder/historian.

Battalion Chiefs will:

- Contact each supervisor under their command to ensure compliance with this procedure on a department-wide basis.
- Be responsible to see that all orders relative to this procedure are carried out in their respective battalions.
- Keep officers and members of all companies under their command apprised of the location of the riot area, hot zones, and conditions.
- If assigned to a Task Force, assume the duties of the Task Force Commander (Cite Appropriate SOP)
- Keep an accurate log of all events taking place in their Battalion and/or Task Force.
- Ensure that all companies under their command are familiar with the procedure for abandoning fire stations, if this becomes necessary. (*See Abandoning Fire Station Section Below)

Company Officers:

- Ensure compliance with this Operational Procedure.
- If any reserve apparatus is housed in your station, notify the FCC of the status of the vehicles and be prepared to relocate the apparatus as directed by FCC Command.
- If located near the affected area or in the hot zone, make preparations for the possibility of abandoning the Fire Station.

EMS Command and Emergency Medical Supervisors:

- The on-call EMS Command and the Emergency Medical Supervisor of the affected Division will respond to the LE Command Post and meet with the Fire Department Operations Chief.
- Determine the boundaries of the riot and ensure that Medic units are not sent into a hot zone.
- Consult with the Fire Operations Assistant/Deputy Chief and determine the status of EMS response in the affected area, including the temporary suspension of service to any hot zone.
- If service must be suspended, work with the Fire and LE Operations Chiefs to develop an alternate means of handling EMS calls. This may include having LE respond to medical calls in the hot zone and transporting patients to a collection point outside of the affected area (Warm/Cold Zone).

- The Emergency Medical Control Officer in the Division not affected by the unrest will proceed to the FCC to assist in any EMS related activities.

Administrative Unit Supervisors will:

- Be concerned with the specific responsibility of their respective units regarding the implementation of this procedure.
- Serve at the discretion of the Fire Chief (Commissioner) or the on-duty Assistant/Deputy Chief (Commissioner).

ABANDONING FIRE STATIONS

During a large scale disorder or riot, it may become necessary to temporarily abandon fire stations due to safety considerations, especially in the hot zone.

- If the safety of firefighters and equipment cannot be assured within the confines of a fire station, then the ranking officer at that location has the authority to remove the company from the area.
- This decision may also be made at the Command Post by the Fire Incident Commander after consultation with LE.
- Companies abandoning a station will notify the FCC and their Battalion Chief of their actions and proceed to the closest fire station in a safe area.

NOTE: This section does not pertain to a company that has been relocated and combined with other units to form a Task Force unless that company commander has been specifically ordered to "abandon the station."

Company commanders, when ordered to abandon their station, will carry out the following actions.

- Take all portable radios and battery chargers with them.
- Take any cellular phones and battery chargers.
- Take all SCBA cylinders (bottles) on board the apparatus.
- Take Commanding Officers Journal, Company logbook and Company run book.
- Take bunker gear of all members/all platoons along with extra PASS devices.
- Lock all doors, windows, lockers and the parking lot gate (if applicable)
- Shut down any electric supply to fuel tanks.
- Shut down utilities to station and secure and lock the station.
- All members are to leave on FD apparatus when abandoning a station.
- Personal vehicles should be stored in a locked parking area, if available. If the station has no secure parking, then personal vehicles may be moved inside to the apparatus floor before leaving. Provision should be made for the removal of personal vehicles to a safe location at the earliest convenience depending on conditions.

NOTE: UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS ANY MEMBER TO REMAIN BEHIND WHEN A STATION IS ABANDONED.

Considerations

- A riot condition presents extreme hazards to firefighting personnel. The potential dangers may include the usual hazards of fire duty plus the threat of physical injury from a variety of weapons, such as rocks, bottles, and firearms.
- Ballistic vests, when issued to Task Force members, will be worn under bunker gear by all members.
- Store a tarp and CO2 or Dry Chemical extinguisher in the cab of the apparatus to protect firefighters from thrown rocks, bottles, or fire bombs.
- Task Force Commanders should assemble their personnel and pass on all relevant information including the type of tactical operations that will be used on scene.
- Task Forces will not commit to any attack until the Task Force Commander has assessed the situation and determined an appropriate strategy and the safety of the location. Task Force Commanders will also determine if and when a Task Force withdraws due to deteriorating conditions.
- Based on previous civil unrest/riot history, the number of fires could be very high. The most effective tactical considerations may include the following actions.
 - Unless a life hazard is present an exterior attack using master streams from deck guns may be most effective. No interior firefighting should be undertaken unless necessary for rescue of known occupants in imminent threat of injury or death. Master streams and a quick knock down should be the preferred strategy.
 - Depending on the number of fires in an area, fires that present no exposure hazard should be left to burn.
 - Depending on the number of fires in an area, Task Forces should respond only to structure fires. Autos and rubbish, unless creating an imminent exposure threat, should be by-passed.
 - Depending on the number of fires in an area, no overhauling should be attempted after the fire is knocked down. While this may present the possibility of a re-ignite, the strategy is to protect exposures, knock down the fire, and move on.
 - Utilize 5" large diameter hose as an above ground water main. Take a wrap on the hydrant so that the pumper is not left alone at the hydrant.
 - If it becomes necessary to abandon an apparatus, the apparatus radio microphone should be removed and the apparatus immobilized, if possible.
 - If LE have helicopter service available, consider utilizing it for an
 - aerial survey of fire conditions.

- No multiple alarms will be utilized in a riot area. If additional help is needed, Task Force commanders are to request additional Task Forces, if available.
- Consider the fatigue factor for personnel operating within the perimeter of the hot zone. Emotions will be highly charged. Command should monitor physical and mental status of response personnel and provide relief companies as deemed appropriate.
- Members should be instructed to bring their bunker gear home with them after their tour of duty. In case of re-assignment or abandonment of a station, this may avoid a shortage of bunker gear.

TASK FORCES

Task Forces will be utilized when conditions present an unusual safety concern to personnel due to hostile or potentially hostile activities in a specific geographic area. The combining of individual companies into Task Forces is done to increase safety, decrease the risk to personnel and to ensure a coordinated, quick fire attack or rescue under potentially hostile conditions.

Task Forces will consist of three Engines, one Ladder, a Battalion Chief w/aide, and an ALS unit, with two LE escorts with four officers each.

During a localized civil unrest/riot, a Task Force may be assembled and staged at a nearby site to respond to verified calls in the area. The decision to implement this type of response will rest with the on scene chief officer.

During a large scale disorder/riot, ONLY Task Forces will be utilized in the affected area. Individual, unescorted companies and Medic Units will not be sent into a hot zone. Task Forces placed in service in conjunction with this procedure will use a letter designation rather than a number, i.e., Task Force "A", Task Force "B", etc.

To maintain communications, Task Force Commanders will utilize portable cellular phones.

Assembling of Task Force(s) will be accomplished in one of two ways:

- The primary method of assembling a Task Force will be to combine companies in nearby stations to assure that three Engines, one Ladder, 1 Battalion Chief with an Aid, and 1 ALS Medic Unit are assembled to become Task Force "A".
- The second method of assembling a Task Force will be to utilize available reserve apparatus and recalled personnel to provide the correct apparatus and staffing for a Task Force. In this second method provision must be made for providing portable radios for the companies.

Law Enforcement Protection

In the event of a MAJOR civil disorder/riot, Task Forces will NOT RESPOND into a hot zone without adequate LE protection. A minimum of 2 LE cars and 8 officers should be assigned to each Task Force before the Task Force is permitted to respond into the affected area.

LE officers assigned to a Task Force will remain with the Task Force at all times to provide security. The LE escort will be considered part of a complete Task Force unit. LE will be permitted to ride on the apparatus if sufficient LE vehicles are not available to escort the Task Force.

When a Task Force is assembled and assigned to a staging area, the Fire Operations Chief will notify the LE Operations Chief of the location of the Task Force's staging area and their designation, i.e. Task Force "A", etc. LE will dispatch the Task Force's escort to that staging area to link up with the Task Force.

Staging Areas

Task Forces will be staged outside any hot zone for response. The primary site for Task Force staging areas will be nearby fire stations. This site provides necessary communications equipment, sanitary facilities, and shelter for personnel. Alternate staging areas may be selected with consideration must be given to communications capabilities, parking space for a Task Force, sanitary facilities, and shelter for personnel.

Locating a staging area at the Command Post is not recommended due to the congestion of LE vehicles and equipment expected at this site. However, in a localized civil disturbance, this site may be suitable and may be used.

More than one Task Force may be assembled at a staging area. If this is necessary, consideration should be given to the ability of a staging site to support more than one Task Force. It may also be advisable to have a Fleet Management mechanic located at a staging area to handle repairs to apparatus.

Assembly Areas

An assembly area is a site where reserve apparatus and recalled personnel will be formed into a Task Force. Consideration must be given to several factors when choosing an assembly area.

- Parking for recalled members' vehicles.
- Communications capabilities of the site
- Shelter and sanitary facilities
- Two examples of suitable assembly areas are:
 - The Fire Academy
 - Marine Unit station (if applicable)

- Once a Task Force is assembled, it will be relocated to a staging area

Task Force Relief should be staggered so that adequate coverage is maintained for the area. If the Task Force was formed at an assembly area, relief should take place back at the assembly area. If the Task Force was formed from active companies, relief should be coordinated with those stations.

FIREGROUND OPERATIONS

The first priority at an emergency scene is life safety including the safety of firefighters. During fireground operations, the perimeter should be secured by LE officers prior to initiating firefighting operations. Only connect to hydrants in the secured area.

Task Force Commander will position the apparatus and determine which tactics will be used. Master streams and exterior hand lines are preferred to control the fire in a defensive mode. Control and containment are the primary objectives. Laddering and/or roof operations should only be undertaken if necessary for rescue of known occupants in imminent threat of injury or death.

Apparatus should be positioned in a manner to allow for rapid evacuation. If ordered to evacuate, personnel should make an effort to get nozzles and equipment back on the apparatus and shut down the hydrant if possible to do so safely. If it is not possible, then companies should leave hose and other equipment on the scene. The task force must remain intact.

EMS calls in the hot zone may be a result of injuries from civil unrest activities, but can also be individuals with illnesses or needs separate and apart from the unrest. Task force units remain together throughout an EMS response. A Response Task Force (RTF) should be assembled from the main task force units and operate the same as in Active Shooter response (SOP# _____).

Once a patient/victim is extracted and prepared for transport, all task force units go with the ambulance. Patients should be transported to a casualty collection area in the cold zone unless the medic in charged determines that immediate hospital care is required in which case the ambulance will proceed with LE escort to the hospital. Upon completion of the transport, the EMS and LE units will return to the staging area and regroup with the rest of their task force.

REFERENCES

Civil Unrest Standard Operating Procedures from urban fire departments throughout the U.S. and Canada including; New York City, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Virginia Beach, Phoenix, Dallas, Seminole County, FL, Orange County, FL, Arlington County, VA, and St. Louis, Houston, Tualatin Valley, Ottawa, and Vancouver.

SAMPLE SOP

Appendix B

City of Ferguson Fire Department Standard Operating Guidelines

Appendix B

Re: <i>Civil Disturbance</i>	City of Ferguson Fire Department Standard Operating Guidelines	SOP# 310 Page 2 of 9 Issued: 10/20/2014 Revised: Reviewed:
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1. Single company response in trouble areas will be stopped
2. A minimum of two (2) companies and one Command Officer shall be sent on all fire calls.
 - The two individual companies shall operate as a single unit
3. No apparatus will be parked outside in trouble areas

D. Prioritizing Incidents

Fire incidents shall have officers, and companies dispatched to them in the following order of priority:

1. Occupied buildings with reports of life in danger
2. Occupied buildings
3. Vacant buildings with occupied exposures buildings
4. Multiple buildings on fire
5. Vital public utilities, i.e.,
Laclede Gas facilities, U.E.
substations, telephone
switching buildings, etc.
6. Response to the following incidents may be reduced, or stopped in the TROUBLE AREAS ONLY.
 - Fully involved buildings with no exposure problems
 - Garages with no exposure
 - Vehicle fires
 - Dumpsters, weeds, rubbish

ACTIONS IN MAJOR DISTURBANCE AREAS

As a civil disturbance escalates, the need to change from traditional fire suppression strategies will be required. If areas become too hostile, the Fire Department/District personnel and equipment will be withdrawn from the fire station in those areas, to staging areas in safe locations. Task Forces will be assembled and will be dispatched from the staging areas.

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A. Task Force Operations

1. Task Forces will be set up as follows:

- Command Officer
- Three (3) fire companies
- At least two (2) of the fire companies must have pumping capability
- Task Forces shall be identified by the Command Officer number i.e., task force will be called "Task Force 2402"
- Mutual Aid units brought in from outside the area should be paired with local units. This will help those not familiar with the area have access to knowledge that could affect Operations and safety.

2. Task Force locations

- Task Forces will be assembled in staging areas outside the trouble areas
- Each staging area will have a designated staging area manager

3. Dispatching Task Forces

- Fire Alarm shall be notify the staging area manager of a Task Force staging area via radio, or cellular telephone, of the type and location of the fire
- The Staging area manager will choose the Task Force that will respond

4. Task Force Support

- As soon as police, highway patrol, or National Guard forces become

available, they will be assigned to escort task forces to incident scenes.

- Logistical support for the task forces shall be provided at the task force staging area, i.e. fuel, air bottles, food, toilet facilities, etc.

B. Abandoning Areas

The Fire Chief or Assigned Command Officer shall make the decision on whether the Fire Department/District personnel and equipment will be pulled out of an area. Factors involved in this decision include police action:

- Is the Police Department pulling out?

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- Is violence being directed toward the Fire Department/District?
- Even though the police are in the area, is there enough control?

INCIDENTS WHERE CIVILIAN LIVES ARE THREATENED
BY FIRE SHALL NOT BE ABANDONED.

PERSONNEL SAFETY

During periods of civil disturbance, members shall take all necessary precautions to protect themselves.

A. *Personal Safety*

All members (including drivers) shall follow these guidelines:

1. Full turnout gear shall be worn to, during, and upon returning from incidents
2. Helmets shall be worn at all times.
Face shields shall be down while riding on apparatus
3. Members shall conduct themselves in a manner that will not result in a hostile confrontation.
4. Members shall not return obscene remarks, or direct comments towards civilians.
5. Do not use hose streams or tools as weapons. EXCEPTION: As a last ditch defense while making an escape from the area
6. If available use of body armor-

Members shall use body armor during any type of civil unrest. Body armor shall be worn as follows:

- Body armor shall be put on prior to leaving the station or staging area
- If an alarm is received while "on the air," in a safe area the apparatus shall pull to the side of the street and stop while all members don their body armor and turnouts.
- Body armor shall be worn under your turnout coat, in a manner that it will not be seen.

B. Response Safety

1. Place as many members in the cab of the apparatus as possible.
2. Keep all windows rolled up.

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3. Emergency warning lights should be kept on at all times when serving in an affected area
4. Keep all hose beds covered with the hose bed covers
5. Fire extinguishers shall be kept with members when responding to, or returning from calls. These are to be used in the event the apparatus is fire bombed
 - Keep the Halon or CO2 extinguishers in the cab
 - Keep the Dry Chemical in the jump seat area
6. Place all tools and equipment carried on the outside of apparatus in compartments or under cover.
7. Size-up the area that you are responding into. Be alert for traps or ambushes.
8. Back into dead end streets.

C. Fire Station Safety

1. Keep all windows and doors, closed and locked.
2. Do not stand near windows, stay inside the station.
3. At night keep lights to a minimum
4. Secure the station as best as possible when leaving.

D. Fire Ground Safety

1. Scenes should be approached with attention to emergency exit in case evacuation of area is ordered.
2. Park apparatus in a manner that will provide as much protection of the scene as possible.

3. DO NOT park pumpers a block away from the fire, with only one member attending it.
4. DO NOT leave members by themselves to make plugs away from the apparatus
5. No member shall be positioned at the tip of aerial ladders
6. Abandoning an incident scene.
 - The Incident Commander has the authority to leave a fire scene if he feels the safety of members is at risk from the public

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- All members shall pickup equipment and leave the scene as quickly as possible
- All members and apparatus shall leave at the same time
- If necessary, cut hose lines, or drive off with hose attached to the apparatus if the situation is that critical.
- INCIDENTS WHERE CIVILIAN LIVES ARE THREATENED BY FIRE SHALL NOT BE ABANDONED

FIREFIGHTING OPERATIONS

A. Changes in Tactics

During periods of civil disturbance fire suppression tactics shall be changed.

1. Pumpers shall not back up other apparatus unless it is needed. If backups are made, two (2) members shall stay with the backup pumper.
2. Quick knock down of fires is paramount
 - Use aerial ladders, and/or deck guns as much as possible.
3. DO NOT OVERHAUL
4. Do not reload hose.
 - Roll hose lines or throw them on the hose bed and leave the area as soon as possible.
 - When companies arrive in safe areas, staging or fire stations, reloading the hose beds will take place.
5. Fire investigations WILL NOT be conducted.

In times of civil disturbance, members of the department/district may encounter situations that are not common for firefighters. Clear communications is essential for the safety of all members.

B. Terminology

In addition to the standard terminology the following terms will help maintain accurate communications.

1. Firefighter shot- A firefighter has been hit by gun fire
2. Firefighter injured as a result of- A firefighter has been injured due to something other than gun fire. A description of the injury and its cause shall be given.
3. Company under fire- The reporting company is being shot at.

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4. Company under attack- The reporting company is being physically attached by civilians.
5. Shots being fired in the area- self explanatory
6. Police protection needed- The police are needed to protect fire department/district personnel and equipment from civilian attack, or the threat of attack.

INTERGRATED TASK FORCE OPERATIONS

A. Multiple Agency Command Structure

When setting up the command structure for dealing with a civil disturbance, the use of the "unified command" concept allows for joint management of the entire situation by the leaders of each of the agencies involved. During a civil disturbance, agencies will be faced with many different types of emergency situations, by utilizing unified command there will be no disputes as to which agency is in charge, the different agencies will be operating as one.

Utilize Incident Command System for fire ground operations

B. Task Force Staging Areas

When a civil disturbance escalates to violence in a wide area and cannot be controlled by the available number of law enforcement personnel, staging areas shall be established. Police, Fire, EMS, and other essential agencies shall deploy equipment, personnel, and command officers to

the staging areas.

A command officer from each agency shall report to the Staging Area Command Post.

The CP will operate as follows:

1. Assemble task forces in accordance with established department guidelines (SOG's)
2. Police, Fire, and EMS dispatching centers shall contact the staging CP with incident information.
3. The Staging Officers shall evaluate the incident information and deploy the task forces accordingly.

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C. Integrated Task Force Composition

Task forces shall be assembled with equipment and personnel from the different departments. The specific make up shall be determined by the type of incident. However, these guidelines should be followed :

1. Fire Suppression Task Force

- 3 Fire Companies
- 1 Fire Department/District Command Officer with driver
- 1 EMS Unit
- Police cars, preferred 1 in front and 1 in back

2. EMS Task Force

- 1 EMS Unit
- 1 Fire Company
- Police cars, preferred 1 in front and 1 in back

D. Response

All units shall respond in convoy fashion. Convoys shall be set up as follows:

- Two (2) police cars in front
- Fire and/or EMS units in the center
- Two (2) police cars in the rear

E. Operations

No matter what type of incident, time is the critical factor. Utilize emergency procedures and protocols based upon departmental procedures.

1. Once on the scene the police shall secure the area as best as they can.
Access to the roofs of nearby buildings

can be gained by using fire department/
district ladders.

- Police TF personnel will be responsible for perimeter security and the overall security for fire and EMS personnel resulting from civil disobedience.
2. Fire and/or EMS personnel shall expedite their operations
 - EMS shall place patients into units as quickly as possible, stabilizing them in the unit, while moving out of the area.
 3. EMS task force shall stay together
- When the ambulance transport the patient(s), all police and ****fire will go with the ambulance

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- Patients will be transported to casualty collection area UNLESS the medic in charge determines that immediate hospital care is required.
 Casualty collection areas are established under EMS procedures, outside the trouble area and away from the staging area.
- These areas will have triage and hospital capabilities
- 4. The ranking fire and police officers at the scene will stay together for both communications and scene supervision
- 5. Fire task forces will go in together and come out together with the following exception:
 - If there is a critically injured individual (a civilian or task force member) that requires immediate transport, the Ems Unit and one (1) police unit will leave.
 - The EMS and Police units will return to the staging area and regroup with the rest of their task force.

F. Safety


1. ALL UNITS THAT ENTER TOGETHER WILL LEAVE TOGETHER.
- 2 POLICE UNITS WILL NOT LEAVE FIRE AND EMS UNITS AT AN INCIDENT SITE.
- 3 IF IT IS DETERMINED BY THE TASK FORCE LEADER THAT THE AREA MUST BE ABANDONED ,
 - The police, fire, and EMS leaders will announce this over their radios.
 - The drivers of the fire apparatus will sound their air horns in one continuous blast for one (1) minute.
 - All personnel will report to their unit leader for a head count.

Appendix C

On-Line Survey and Responses

Q1 How long have you been a member of the Fire Service?


Answered: 58 Skipped: 0



Answer Choices	Responses
1 - 5 years	0.00% 0
6 - 10 years	1.72% 1
10 - 15 years	3.45% 2
16 - 20 years	15.52% 9
21 - 25 years	32.76% 19
26 + years	46.55% 27
Total	58

Q2 What is your current rank?

Answered: 57 Skipped: 1




Answer Choices	Responses
Firefighter	0.00%
Firefighter/Emergency Medical Technician	1.75%
Firefighter/Paramedic	0.00%

Engineer	0.00%	(
Apparatus Operator	0.00%	(
Fire Inspector	0.00%	0
Fire Captain I	14.04%	8
District/Battalion Chief	8.77%	5
Assistant Chief	15.79%	9
Deputy Chief	14.04%	8
Chief Deputy	0.00%	0
Fire Chief	29.82%	17
Civilian	0.00%	0
Other (please specify)	15.79%	9
Total		57

#	Other (please specify)	Date
1	Lieutenant	2/20/2017 10:20 AM
2	J	2/20/2017 2:55 AM
3	Captain II	2/19/2017 12:45 PM
4	Lt. Paramedic	2/19/2017 11:58 AM
5	Director	2/19/2017 11:45 AM
6	Division Chief	2/17/2017 4:52 AM
7	Lieutenant	2/16/2017 2:58 PM
8	Community Disaster Volunteer CERT certificated	2/16/2017 2:55 PM
9	Captain/Medical Officer/Paramedic/Firefighter	2/16/2017 1:47 PM

Q3 Is your department career, volunteer, or a combination of both?


Answered: 57 Skipped: 1



Answer Choices	Responses
Career	71.93% 41
Volunteer	3.51% 2
Combination	24.56% 14
Total	57

Q4 How many members of your department are uniform members?

Answered: 58 Skipped: 0




Answer Choices	Responses
1 - 200	72.41% 42
201 - 500	10.34% 6
501 - 1000	5.17% 3
1001 +	12.07% 7
Other (please specify)	0.00% 0
Total	58

#	Other (please specify)	Date
	There are no responses.	

Q5 How many members of your department are civilian?

Answered: 57 Skipped: 1




Answer Choices	Responses
1 - 20	66.67% 38
21 - 50	12.28% 7
51 - 100	5.26% 3
101 +	8.77% 5
Other (please specify)	7.02% 4
Total	57

#	Other (please specify)	Date
1	None	2/21/2017 12:49 PM
2	3. 2 secretaries 1 mechanic	2/20/2017 2:55 AM
3	Zero	2/19/2017 11:47 AM
4	0	2/17/2017 4:52 AM

Q6 How would you rate the effectiveness of your Fire Department's overall community relations programs/activities?

Answered: 57 Skipped: 1




Answer Choices	Responses
Not effective	10.53% 6
Somewhat effective	35.09% 20
Effective	28.07% 16
Very effective	24.56% 14
Other (please specify)	1.75% 1
Total	57

#	Other (please specify)	Date
1	Poor	2/21/2017 12:49 PM

Q7 Does your Fire Department have community programs that are based out of the local fire station?

Answered: 57 Skipped: 1




Answer Choices	Responses	
Yes	70.18%	40
No	29.82%	17
Other (please specify)	0.00%	0
Total		57

#	Other (please specify)	Date
	There are no responses.	

Q8 My Fire Department values diversity and inclusion when serving community residents?

Answered: 58 Skipped: 0




Answer Choices	Responses
Yes	86.21% 50
No	10.34% 6
Other (please specify)	3.45% 2
Total	58

#	Other (please specify)	Date
1	We have never actively addressed diversity.	2/27/2017 7:22 PM
2	We're working on it. Getting better.	2/16/2017 5:58 PM

Q9 During emergency operations, my Fire Department implements the incident command system?

Answered: 57 Skipped: 1




Answer Choices	Responses	Count
Not effective	1.75%	1
Somewhat effective	7.02%	4
Effective	33.33%	19
Very effective	56.14%	32
Other (please specify)	1.75%	1
Total		57

#	Other (please specify)	Date
1	Sometimes to a fault. It sometimes runs the incident rather than using it as an organization tool.	2/19/2017 12:45 PM

Q10 During emergency operations, my Fire Department operates in unified command with other law enforcement agencies?

Answered: 57 Skipped: 1



Answer Choices	Responses
Not effective	8.77% 5
Somewhat effective	21.05% 12
Effective	38.60% 22
Very effective	26.32% 15
Other (please specify)	5.26% 3
Total	57

#	Other (please specify)	Date
1	Our police don't like ICS	2/27/2017 7:22 PM
2	When needed	2/19/2017 12:45 PM
3	We're trying. Law enforcement doesn't seem to grasp the concept. They seem to want to own every incident.	2/16/2017 1:47 PM

Q11 In your experience/opinion,
what are some of the socio-
economic factors that can
contribute to violent
incidents developing in your
community?

Answered: 53 Skipped: 5

#	Responses	Date
1	Emotional disturbances with an opportunity for mass violence	2/27/2017 7:22 PM
2	Lower income communities seem to be undeserved.	2/27/2017 3:03 PM
3	Pre-existing tensions Local media driven events Political campaigns	2/22/2017 3:55 PM
4	Lack of employment, lack of interaction, lack of a sense of belonging. Indifference	2/22/2017 5:55 AM
5	Low income residents who do not feel that they have a voice in the community.	2/21/2017 9:45 PM
6	Poverty without hope. Lack of programs, lack of empathy, coupled with desperation.	2/21/2017 4:41 PM
7	We are a low to moderate income community, with a 85% African American population. The remaining 15% is a diverse mix of White, Mexican, Asian and Indian.	2/21/2017 12:49 PM
8	Unemployment. Education	2/21/2017 12:05 PM
9	we haven't had any civil unrest but we are seeing more non-violent protests against recent statements and activities by new president's administration	2/21/2017 11:55 AM
10	Racism, High unemployment rate, Migration from larger communities into our smaller community.	2/21/2017 8:11 AM
11	Historically its has been with gang members in our commuity.	2/20/2017 10:29 AM
12	We have avoided violent incidents, even bordering a large city.	2/20/2017 10:20 AM
13	The lack of jobs, low paid rate jobs, many taxes, a no clear government economic policy	2/20/2017 10:20 AM
14	Poverty and lack of a clear pathway to social mobility. Additionally, some clashes occur between individuals that have chosen different lifestyles. Finally, I would argue that we need comprehensive care for mental illness.	2/20/2017 9:33 AM
15	We serve a fairly affluent community with a tourism based economy. We've never had any community level violent incidents.	2/20/2017 8:50 AM
16	no specific notable single factor contributes to violence in the community.	2/20/2017 7:25 AM
17	unemployment	2/20/2017 3:31 AM
18	Not understanding the current values and needs of the community. Being reactive instead of proactive with the community served.	2/20/2017 2:55 AM
19	Low income Non-English speaking	2/19/2017 8:48 PM
20	Political views, loss of major employer	2/19/2017 4:47 PM
21	Idol teens, lack of parental oversight (working, single parent home, etc)	2/19/2017 3:28 PM
22	Economic downturns.	2/19/2017 2:29 PM
23	Education, self respect and respect towards others.	2/19/2017 1:25 PM

24	I believe that it is often used as a "poor me" crutch. Yes low income neighborhoods can be and often are more violent but there are also some great people in these neighborhoods fighting for peace and dignity. IT'S NOT ALWAYS SOMEONE ELSE'S FAULT. Look in the mirror, that's the person you have complete control over.	2/19/2017 12:45 PM
25	Poor	2/19/2017 12:38 PM
26	Racial divide, some warranted. Some of it pushed by a political agenda that may not be accurate. Lack of opportunities in some of the communities. A poor education system that is failing our youth. Our education system in the city of Los Angeles is broken. Some of the communities never have a chance to climb out of poverty. Our elected officials not following through with their promises.	2/19/2017 12:13 PM
27	Lack of access to quality health care. Lack of access to drug/alcohol dependency counseling services. Lack of access to mental health services.	2/19/2017 12:07 PM
28	We have a very diverse community with some small drug related issues.	2/19/2017 11:58 AM
29	Poverty. Education.	2/19/2017 11:47 AM
30	Unemployment, low level criminal activity, education	2/19/2017 11:45 AM
31	Poverty and Drug Abuse.	2/19/2017 9:42 AM
32	Influx of renters pushed out of higher-cost neighborhoods into our community which has been traditionally "locals only"	2/17/2017 2:42 PM
33	Our demographics place us as a lower income area, with more crime and drug issues. These things alone have an impact on how people behave when desperate or whether they respect the rights of others because they may feel pressured by their own circumstances. Some simply have an altered view law abiding or lack of public trust.	2/17/2017 10:02 AM
34	Lack of employment opportunities	2/17/2017 9:32 AM
35	Low income, gang affiliation.	2/17/2017 8:25 AM
36	so far, we are lucky not to have had any.	2/17/2017 7:28 AM
37	Disparity in incomes and racial tensions. We have a very diverse population in both incomes and races.	2/17/2017 6:24 AM
38	drugs alcohol hunger	2/17/2017 4:48 AM
39	Large Black population	2/17/2017 4:12 AM
40	Misunderstandings and assumptions in various communities and cultures. Lack of having basic needs easily met can lead to frustrations and violence	2/16/2017 5:58 PM
41	Gangs	2/16/2017 5:18 PM
42	disconnect between lower income citizens and council - not serving their best interest.	2/16/2017 3:54 PM
43	Drug and alcohol use. Bias/prejudice among racial and ethnic factors. Mistrust among racial and ethnic factors.	2/16/2017 3:32 PM
44	Ours is a very high dollar community. We do not have the chance of civil unrest or violence in this area.	2/16/2017 2:58 PM
45	low values	2/16/2017 2:55 PM
46	disgruntled workers/people	2/16/2017 2:09 PM
47	We have not had a previous civil unrest event. We are a flat middle-class community with little economic divergence. Our biggest "threat" would actually be responding to another community (City of Chicago), or having a civil unrest incident spill over via public transportation (commuter rail).	2/16/2017 2:07 PM
48	With the opening of retail marijuana facilities, a transient population moves through the area causing some unrest with local citizens. The typical upper/lower class separation is not much of a factor in a small rural town where we operate.	2/16/2017 1:56 PM

49	Racial	2/16/2017 1:55 PM
50	We would be exposed to these incidents as a mutual aid response, as we did during the Ferguson response, but our District is in the South St. Louis metro area and not so socio-economically disadvantaged	2/16/2017 1:52 PM
51	Lack of trust between citizens and police, including City leaders.	2/16/2017 1:48 PM
52	The perception that public safety agencies exist to maintain the status quo and keep people in their place.	2/16/2017 1:47 PM
53	Racial differences, poverty	2/14/2017 5:59 PM

Q12 In your opinion, what changes would you recommend to improve your Fire Department's community relations programs?

Answered: 53 Skipped: 5

#	Responses	Date
1	Expand and become more inclusive. There are more people in town than just kids and seniors.	2/27/2017 7:22 PM
2	Develop a program and include community members in the development if the program	2/27/2017 3:03 PM
3	Better community outreach, more resources, such as time, money, and personnel	2/23/2017 3:36 PM
4	outreach sessions, community networking, solicit input from community leaders, groups, etc	2/22/2017 3:55 PM
5	Involve more of the ethnic organizations. Brining them onboard to reach out to the groups that are socially a tight community	2/22/2017 5:55 AM
6	I believe there should be more pro-active community relations, and more public relations awareness for the department.	2/21/2017 9:45 PM
7	More diversity throughout the ranks, encourage Fire Department personnel to get involved in community activities. Provide resources for outreach.	2/21/2017 4:41 PM
8	Fund it properly.	2/21/2017 12:49 PM
9	Better community outreach	2/21/2017 12:05 PM
10	lack of time and resources limits our ability to spend quality time in the neighborhoods, on the streets and in the schools. I'd like to do more face-to-face community work.	2/21/2017 11:55 AM
11	Educating our firefighters on diversity in the community. Promoting diversity in our department.	2/21/2017 8:11 AM
12	A department cultural changes getting newer firefighters more invloved in their community. Many work their shift and go home to another commuity close by.	2/20/2017 10:29 AM
13	We operate as best we can with available funding. With more funding we would increase our targeted focus to the incidents we see on a less frequent basis.	2/20/2017 10:20 AM
14	Use more the local stations to impact the community	2/20/2017 10:20 AM
15	There is always room for improvement. However, I believe and the citizen surveys indicate we are doing a good job. We engage the community on multiple levels, including outreach programs to assist the homeless.	2/20/2017 9:33 AM
16	I feel that we could be better with active engagement of under-served populations within our community. This can be accomplished through attendance at community events. Simple presence goes a long way. The fire service tends to travel in packs. Team mentality is drilled into us from the first day we put on the uniform. If we are to fully engage the community we serve we need to get the engine/truck/rescue companies out in the community parks (or other local gathering places) talking with people, having a real conversation, letting them know that we are here to serve THEM. We need to do that as individuals, not as an intimidating clump of 3-5 firefighters. We need to open the bay doors of the station. Talk to passers by as we do our morning equipment checks. Engage with the community on a personal level. This type of thing spreads like an infection of positivity.	2/20/2017 8:50 AM
17	More involvement with Governing Body supported community events.	2/20/2017 7:25 AM
18	More risk reduction and education about the department programs	2/20/2017 3:31 AM
19	I would have a fire department open house. Serve food for the community. During the summer walk the neighborhoods during the day on the weekends. Talk to the people. Find out what is frustrating them the most.	2/20/2017 2:55 AM

20	More financial support More employees for this area	2/19/2017 8:48 PM
21	More involvement and the development of a PIO and Fire & Life Safety Education Team to communicate effectively with the community	2/19/2017 4:47 PM
22	Prioritize community relations and get out there more	2/19/2017 3:28 PM
23	Better management and less yes men running the town government	2/19/2017 2:29 PM
24	Continued engagement in community/ fire service awareness through dialogue. Better engagement in Youth Development programs.	2/19/2017 1:25 PM
25	Start at the foundation. Our service to the public. PROVIDE A GOOD SERVICE !!!	2/19/2017 12:45 PM
26	Be more active with all residents	2/19/2017 12:38 PM
27	Expand our youth cadet program. Actually hire from the investment we make in these young men and women. We pour hours into their lives and we don't end up hiring them when they are eligible to be hired with our department. We need to as a department attend more meetings with our communities and cut them in on the role of the Fire department and how we can serve them and how they can help us help them. We are reactive to many times. Not proactive.	2/19/2017 12:13 PM
28	Greater interaction of firefighters with members of the community living near the fire station. Linking those in need with service providers that can help them.	2/19/2017 12:07 PM
29	Spend more time reaching out to the community by going to them.	2/19/2017 11:47 AM
30	None	2/19/2017 11:45 AM
31	Formal scheduled presentation to the various community and civic groups	2/19/2017 9:42 AM
32	Increased focus on outcomes versus outputs.	2/17/2017 2:42 PM
33	1. Dedicated full-time position to serve as a liaison in the community to coordinate programs and initiatives. 2. More full-time operations personnel to assure commitments are met. We rely heavily on volunteers and daytime hours (when most programs and activities are performed) which limits us in our ability to cover commitments between emergency activities and other department responsibilities. 3. Better media/technology - Our city is small and limited on budget and technological expertise, so the ability to do creative media relations and provide online information is limited. We have started a Facebook to counter this, and we still use the local newspaper, but our city website management is poor and getting regular updates for public information is slow.	2/17/2017 10:02 AM
34	Funding	2/17/2017 9:32 AM
35	Bi-lingual education, cultural education.	2/17/2017 8:25 AM
36	besides having an open house each month, not entirely sure.	2/17/2017 7:28 AM
37	Reach out more to community groups for individual presentations. Currently, we have presentations at schools and during community events.	2/17/2017 6:24 AM
38	Work more closely with some of our civic groups.	2/17/2017 4:48 AM
39	Probably very little can be done at this time in history	2/17/2017 4:12 AM
40	Partnering for Prevention. Identifying who our "communities" are. Developing partnerships and finding out what the various communities need from us to begin to gain trust. Knowing the various social resources available to direct individuals to for assistance. I can talk for hours about this stuff!	2/16/2017 5:58 PM
41	Do more. Empower companies to take ownership.	2/16/2017 5:18 PM
42	More contact with youngest generation.	2/16/2017 3:54 PM
43	There needs to be a larger strategic community relation program that fire and emergency services is a component of so that overall government programs.	2/16/2017 3:32 PM

44	Be proactive and get involved with home owner associations, neighborhood meetings along with a PD representative.	2/16/2017 2:58 PM
45	More Fire Prevencions.	2/16/2017 2:55 PM
46	We have to balance the need to be part of our community vs the need to insulate ourselves from harm from the negative members of the community.	2/16/2017 2:09 PM
47	Increase social media exposure.	2/16/2017 2:07 PM
48	A little better promotion.	2/16/2017 1:56 PM
49	Dedicated person with enough rank to effect a change. Support from the command staff and city	2/16/2017 1:55 PM
50	Overall, we do a pretty good job, perhaps more focused on the average citizen vs. schools, kids, the elderly and special needs citizens	2/16/2017 1:52 PM
51	Our current programs are pieced together with ideas that are integrated nor effective. We should start over by first identifying our community relationship goals and listen to community members about how best we can achieve our these goals.	2/16/2017 1:48 PM
52	Actually have one.	2/16/2017 1:47 PM
53	To attend community events, such as - Fairs, Carnivals, go the social and civic gatherings and attend neighborhood meetings.	2/14/2017 5:59 PM

Q13 In your opinion, what recommendations would you make to improve your Fire Department's unified strategy and tactics when operating with law enforcement agencies at emergency incidents?

Answered: 54 Skipped: 4

#	Responses	Date
1	Get our police chief to retire so his officers will finally be allowed to work with us under a command system.	2/27/2017 7:22 PM
2	More training with surrounding agencies	2/27/2017 3:03 PM
3	inter-departmental training	2/23/2017 3:36 PM
4	train, train, train...	2/22/2017 3:55 PM
5	More of a joint training approach. When members train together, and know each other, the atmosphere changes overtime in my experience.	2/22/2017 5:55 AM
6	We already perform tabletop and active drills with our law enforcement agencies, to improve face-to-face communication in case of such events.	2/21/2017 9:45 PM
7	More clearly define roles and expectations. Provide a unified and coordinated message during and after incidents.	2/21/2017 4:41 PM
8	At this time none. We operate very well together.	2/21/2017 12:49 PM
9	Great relations with our law enforcement. Improvement can be made by training together	2/21/2017 12:05 PM
10	establishment of relationships and planning before the incidents is critical to success	2/21/2017 11:55 AM
11	Better communications and training between departments. We do not have a lot of incidents with an unified command system. The police are just adopting ICS in their command structure.	2/21/2017 8:11 AM
12	In our department the improvements will have to be directed from the City Manager to get some movement. The fire department is willing a ready but is not getting any support from the new police chief.	2/20/2017 10:29 AM
13	We operate very well with law enforcement. We actually have seven different law enforcement agencies we regularly interact with with very few problems.	2/20/2017 10:20 AM
14	More joint training	2/20/2017 10:20 AM
15	Here again we do a fairly good job. I would advocate for more multi-jurisdictional simulated training events. The focus on active shooter training has improved interagency efficiency tremendously.	2/20/2017 9:33 AM
16	Meet regularly with local precinct commanders for training and simulations. We are served by a county sheriff's department, so connecting with the people specifically assigned to our area is key to operational effectiveness. Begin with meeting for coffee and to put a face to a name. Develop the relationships and begin working toward common goals. Keep the concept of service delivery at the forefront. Avoid turf battles or ego. Identify the operational objectives and assign them to the responsible agencies with the critical understanding that we are one team working toward the common goal of incident stabilization.	2/20/2017 8:50 AM
17	Practice, practice, practice.	2/20/2017 7:25 AM
18	Law enforcement needs to practice and train with ICE and NIMS more often	2/20/2017 3:31 AM
19	Acting in a support role. During civil unrest I believe the piece of the pie is more for the blue then red.	2/20/2017 2:55 AM

20	Regular training and familiarization	2/19/2017 8:48 PM
21	engagement with other agencies and develop a TRUE understanding of operational Unified Command and not give lip service to the process	2/19/2017 4:47 PM
22	More frequent pre-incident training/interactions to understand the other disciplines needs, priorities, and operations.	2/19/2017 3:28 PM
23	Better state and federal laws separating the legal authority given to fire officers and law enforcement.	2/19/2017 2:29 PM
24	Continued training efforts as well as continue establishing unified command under small incidents. This establishes a set foundation and professional relationships that will be needed during large scale incidents.	2/19/2017 1:25 PM
25	Train with them at the lowest level. Then at the command level.	2/19/2017 12:45 PM
26	Training	2/19/2017 12:38 PM
27	Communicate more. Setup table top drills that force the IC's to work together. The boots on the ground get it. The department heads out the ones disconnected. Check the egos at the door. Drill and train on unified command more frequent. Active shooter, brush incidents, earthquake scenario's, civil unrest incidents, are some examples of regular drills that should be taking place. We are not as prepared as we think we are.	2/19/2017 12:13 PM
28	Start well before the incident and recognize that both agencies have a specific role, those roles overlap and we must work together.	2/19/2017 12:07 PM
29	We work well with local and state law enforcement. Continued understanding of both roles.	2/19/2017 11:58 AM
30	We are pretty effective. We train together and operate out of a consolidated dispatch center.	2/19/2017 11:47 AM
31	None	2/19/2017 11:45 AM
32	Required training for Chief FIRE officers and scheduled interoperability meetings that include all stake holders	2/19/2017 9:42 AM
33	None	2/17/2017 2:42 PM
34	1. We have a good working relationship with our Police department. We could do better with the County Sheriffs office. 2. We are working on better communications, and interoperability for incidents. 3. EOC operations and higher level training (Active Shooter) are all part of the departments working better together. 3. SOG's are being shared with regular meetings between departments so that our operational differences and expectations can be addressed and that safety of responders based on the type of incident is placed at the forefront.	2/17/2017 10:02 AM
35	More drills together	2/17/2017 9:32 AM
36	None, we are effective.	2/17/2017 8:25 AM
37	we do work fairly effectively together but most police agencies don't always participate in the incident command system.	2/17/2017 7:28 AM
38	More drills throughout the year to better acquaint personnel with policy and procedures.	2/17/2017 6:24 AM
39	Continue large scale scenario based exercises and training. This has proved to be beneficial already and should only solidify our current protocols.	2/17/2017 4:48 AM
40	Police agencies are not NIMS compliant or very good at playing within a NIMS atmosphere	2/17/2017 4:12 AM
41	Train together more at the troop level. Quarterly meetings with the operational staff. Joint, pre-planned IAP's that can be "pulled off the shelf" and adjusted accordingly for emerging events.	2/16/2017 5:58 PM
42	We just need police to value UC and not make it an afterthought	2/16/2017 5:18 PM
43	Have BC's and law enforcement on duty equivalent to BC meet on a regular basis and run multiagency drills.	2/16/2017 3:54 PM

44	Training. Training. Training.	2/16/2017 3:32 PM
45	They have to want to work with the FD to make this work. This has been a problem for many years that PD only wants to do things their way.	2/16/2017 2:58 PM
46	My Opinion is very Good Idea if they worked together Better Results for any Incidents.But all fires Department his principal Objetive is to save,Rescue or to overcome any Human Risk.But they joined, will be a god Serioueness.	2/16/2017 2:55 PM
47	It's important to start young. We host a fire orientation with new law enforcement recruits and we invite law enforcement to host police orientation during fire academies. Rescue Task Force is forcing us to blend our capabilities to protect our public.	2/16/2017 2:09 PM
48	Further training with area law enforcement.	2/16/2017 2:07 PM
49	More training with multiple agencies to iron out the wrinkles that occasionally come up at an incident.	2/16/2017 1:56 PM
50	Law enforcement does not view fire staff as equals. Law enforcement needs orders from the top and integration/introduction of fire staff priorities to incidents.	2/16/2017 1:55 PM
51	More inter-agency training and exercises, our L/E partners are focused on their mission and so willing to engage in unified command or having a liaison at the the ICP during a large	2/16/2017 1:52 PM
52	Implement an indepth training of all Chief Officers and Company Officers on ICS, develop a standing Type 3 team with Police and Emergency Management that trains regularly, and practiced concepts of ICS at all incidents and levels so that we are ready for more complex incidents.	2/16/2017 1:48 PM
53	Regular interaction (training etc.) other than just at incidents.	2/16/2017 1:47 PM
54	Practice during drills with other agencies.	2/14/2017 5:59 PM